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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three essays.
In the rst essay, Enoch Hill and I present a general equilibrium model where het-
erogeneous consumers endogenously choose whether to become workers, consumers or
entrepreneurs in order to analyze how limits on the leverage of banks aect real output.
In our model tighter limits on the leverage of banks cause an increase in the spread
between the interest rate that banks charge for loans and the interest rate that banks
pay for deposits. A higher spread results in two types of distortions: First, rms with
the same productivity will have dierent size. Second, productive rms will cease to
exist, while nonproductive ones will enter. These distortions result in lower production.
In the second essay, Enoch Hill and I develop a general equilibrium model of theft,
private security and public law enforcement (PLE) which matches both macro and
micro empirical evidence. We nd a non-monotonic relation between PLE and aggregate
production. In particular, for countries with relatively small amounts of PLE, increasing
the level can result in a reduction of aggregate production and welfare primarily due
to an increase in the incarceration rate. However, for countries with higher levels of
PLE, an increase in the level improves production and welfare. We also nd the private
security causes a negative externality in economies with low levels of PLE.
In the third essay, Enoch Hill, Michael Maio and I propose an original model of
rm hierarchy which suggests that rm structure is important for understanding the
wage structure. In our model, more productive rms choose to employ more levels of
management, which requires a higher average level of skill in workers and consequently
a higher average skill premium. This is consistent with what we document in the
Chilean data and also agrees with the rm size to skill premium relationship commonly
documented in the literature. Additionally, our model predicts that skill premium is
increasing in the ratio of workers to managers, a fact we also observe in the Chilean
data.
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Chapter 1
Leverage Away Your Wedge: An
Analysis of Banks' Impact on
Output
1.1 Introduction
The banking sector doesn't produce a tangible product but it is clear that it has a
tangible eect on the real economy. In this paper we develop a model which allows
us to analyze what these eects are and the channel through which these eects are
transmitted. Using our model we nd that the leverage of banks has both direct and
indirect eects on occupational choice, and also indirectly eects the distribution of rm
sizes, and real output. The primary channel through which these eects are transmitted
is through the spread between the interest rate that banks charge for loans and the
interest rate that banks pay for deposits which we will henceforth refer to as the margin
of intermediation. We will consider a model without risk so we will only focus on the
downside of having limits on the leverage of banks.
In our model rms need to pay for their workers before they produce, in the spirit of
Arellano, Bai, and Kehoe (2012). To do this, they can either use their own assets or can
take out loans from the banking sector. The primary result from our model is that as
banks become less leveraged (i.e. the ratio between deposits over equity decreases), the
1
2resulting margin of intermediation in the general equilibrium increases. This margin is
responsible for two types of distortion relative to a model with an unconstrained banking
sector: First, rms with the same productivity will hire dierent amounts of workers
depending on the assets of the rm. Second, skilled unwealthy consumers will choose to
work rather than become entrepreneurs, while nonskilled wealthy consumers will choose
to manage rms. In addition, lower leverage in the banking sector will require more
bankers to satisfy the demand for loans and deposits. Each of these factors results in a
reduction in real output.
An appealing feature of our model is its clear and intuitive characterization of occu-
pational choice among consumers. We allow heterogeneity in consumers along two di-
mensions; namely, wealth and skill. Rich unskilled consumers choose to become bankers
while unwealthy unskilled consumers become workers and skilled consumers choose to
manage rms as entrepreneurs. In the parameterization where banks are innitely
leveraged, real allocations are not dependant upon wealth and the model collapses to
the model in Lucas (1978) where wealth only aects consumption but has no eect on
occupational choice or real output. In this case skilled consumers choose to become
entrepreneurs while unskilled consumers choose to work; and the marginal productiv-
ity across rms is constant and rms are perfectly assortative in size along the skill of
entrepreneurs.
As the leverage of the banking sector decreases, the margin of intermediation in-
creases. As a consequence, the wealth of consumers begin to have real eects on oc-
cupational choices of consumers and the hiring decisions of rms, since this causes the
cost of the marginal worker to dier based on the wealth of the entrepreneur. Es-
sentially, wealthy entrepreneurs face a lower marginal cost per worker than unwealthy
entrepreneurs, which causes rm size to vary across the wealth of entrepreneurs. For
two entrepreneurs with the same skill level, the wealthier entrepreneur will hire more
workers than the less wealthy entrepreneur. If the skill of the entrepreneurs is su-
ciently small, it is possible that the unwealthy consumer will prefer to become a worker
rather than manage a rm and face the higher interest rate on loans required to hire
workers. Additionally, it is possible that wealthy consumers, who would have worked in
the scenario where banks are innitely leveraged, are incented to become entrepreneurs
due to the reduction in the return of their assets. Even though their skill at managing
3workers is low relative to the rest of the entrepreneurs, they can obtain a higher return
from using their wealth to hire workers rather than investing their assets with banks.
We relate our model to the misallocation literature. Banerjee and Moll (2010),
Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2011) and Midrigan and Xu (2014), among others, analyze
the role of misallocation on the productivity of an economy. In these models, misallo-
cation arises mostly due to nancial constraints. In our case, it is the leverage of the
nancial intermediaries that causes the misallocation.
Our model is also related to the literature relating nancial development and e-
ciency with production. Levine (2005) oers a comprehensive literature review of this
eld. In Greenwood, Sanchez, and Wang (2010) and Greenwood, Sanchez, and Wang
(2013) costly state verication causes a dierence in the marginal product of capital and
its user cost. In our model it is the leverage of the banking sector that causes dierent
consumers to face dierent interest rates.
Erosa (2001) is probably the most similar model to ours. In his model interme-
diation costs cause an exogenous margin of intermediation. In our case this margin
of intermediation arises endogenously from the leverage of the banking sector. Erosa
(2001) also analyzes occupational choice, although in his setup the only heterogeneity
of consumers is in age, as his model is dynamic. We explore an additional occupational
choice; namely, becoming a banker.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 presents the model; Section 1.3
characterizes the solution to the model; Section 1.4 presents a benchmark model without
limits on the leverage of banks; Section 1.5 shows the main results; Section 1.6 highlights
preliminary relations we observe in data. Finally, Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Model
We consider a two period model. Consumers are heterogeneously endowed with skill
and wealth. At the beginning of the rst period they choose whether to become workers,
entrepreneurs or bankers. Workers receive their wages in the rst period and save to
consume in the second period. Entrepreneurs manage rms and need to pay their
workers in the rst period. Nonetheless, the rms they manage produce in the second
period. Therefore they might need to borrow from banks in order to pay their wage
4bills. Bankers set up a bank in the rst period and receive the prots from the bank in
the second period. Banks take deposits from consumers and lend to rms. They face
an exogenous limit on their leverage.
We assume that there is a unit measure of consumers who maximize utility by
choosing to be an entrepreneur, a worker or a banker. Each consumer is endowed
with a skill level z and some wealth a. We assume that z and a are drawn from
a distribution with positive support that we will denote by G(z  a). A consumer's
decision is characterized by z and a, so we will denote consumers by the realizations of
these random variables. Consider consumer (z; a). He solves the following problem
u(z; a) = max
O

uW(a); uE(z; a); uB(a)
	
; (1.1)
where uW(a) denotes the utility derived from becoming a worker, uE(z; a) is the utility
from becoming an entrepreneur, and uB(a) is the utility from becoming a banker.
1.2.1 Workers
Denote the set of workers by W. In period 1 workers use their wages w and wealth to
consume and to save, s. In the second period the worker's income is given by the return
on savings, rD. The utility of being a worker with wealth a is given by (1.2).
uW(a) = max
s
ln c1 +  ln c2 (1.2)
c1 = w + a  s
c2 = (1 + r
D)s:
1.2.2 Entrepreneurs
Denote the set of entrepreneurs by E . In the rst period entrepreneurs use their wealth
to consume, to pay for the workers l they hire, and they can save or borrow. In the
second period entrepreneurs consume the production of the rm. If they borrowed in
the rst period, they repay their debt at an interest rate of rL. If they saved, they get
a return of rD on their savings. The utility of being an entrepreneur with skill z and
5wealth a is given by (1.3).
uE(z; a) = max
s;l
ln c1 +  ln c2 (1.3)
c1 = a  wl   s
c2 = zl
 + (1 + rL)s1fs<0g
+ (1 + rD)s1fs0g:
Each entrepreneurs belongs to one of three types: Entrepreneurs that borrow to pay
for their workers, s < 0, entrepreneurs that have enough wealth to pay for workers and
deposit the dierence, s > 0, and entrepreneurs that spend all their available wealth to
hire workers, s = 0. We will denote by EL the set of entrepreneurs that borrow, by ED
the set of entrepreneurs that save and by EO the rest of entrepreneurs.
1.2.3 Bankers
Denote the set of bankers by B. In the rst period bankers consume part of their wealth.
The rest of their wealth, s, is used as equity for the bank they manage. In the second
period bankers consume the prots from that bank. The utility of a banker with wealth
a is given by (1.4).
uB(a) = max
s
ln c1 +  ln c2 (1.4)
c1 = a  s
c2 = 
B(s):
The prots of a bank with equity s are given by (1.5)
B(s)  max
L;D
(1 + rL)L  (1 + rD)D (1.5)
s. t. D + s = L
D
s
 :
6The rst constraint in (1.5) is the balance sheet constraint of the bank: The bank lends
its equity and the deposits it takes. The second constraint implies that there is a limit
on how many resources a bank can intermediate. Specically the limit is on how many
deposits a bank can take per unit of equity. This limit is exogenous and we denote it
by .
We now dene an equilibrium for this economy:
Denition 1. An equilibrium for this economy is allocations xW(a)  fsW(a)g, xE(z; a) 
fl(z; a); sE(z; a)g, xB(a)  fsB(a)g and xB(s)  LB(s); DB(s)	, prices p  fw; rL; rDg
and sets W, B and E such that
1. W, B and E are such that O(z; a) is a solution to (1.1) for all (z; a);
2. given p, xW(a) is a solution to (1.2);
3. given p, xE(z; a) is a solution to (1.3);
4. given p, xB(a) is a solution to (1.4);
5. given p, xB(s) is a solution to (1.5);
6. and markets clear:
(a) Deposits:Z
W
sW(a)dG(z  a) +
Z
ED
sE(z; a)dG(z  a) =
Z
B
DB(sB(a))dG(z  a);
(b) loans: Z
EL
sE(z; a)dG(z  a) +
Z
B
LB(sB(a))dG(z  a) = 0;
(c) labor: Z
W
dG(z  a) =
Z
E
l(z; a)dG(z  a);
(d) goods: Z
c1(z; a)dG(z  a) =
Z
adG(z  a)Z
c2(z; a)dG(z  a) =
Z
E
zl(z; a)dG(z  a):
71.3 Characterizing the model
We will rst prove that in equilibrium the interest rate of loans is greater than the
interest rate on deposits. This implies that there is an incentive to manage a bank,
rather to deposit in one. Additionally, the prots from banks are linear in the wealth
that is used to run them.
Lemma 1. In equilibrium rL  rD >  1 and rL = rD only as  ! 1. Furthermore,
the prots of a bank with equity s can be written as B(s) = (1 + rB)s with
rB = rL + (rL   rD);
rB  rD and rB = rD only as  ! 1. Additionally, loan supply and deposit demand
are given by
Dd(s) = s (1.6)
Ls(s) = (1 + )s:
Proof. First notice that if rD   1, then banks will demand an innite amount of
deposits. If rL < rD then banks will not supply loans since the cost of deposits is higher
than the revenue they can get from lending, so it must be the case that rL  rD. Now,
the bank is risk neutral. Therefore the second constraint in (1.5) binds. The supply of
loans follows from the balance sheet constraint (D(s) + s = L(s)). This proves (1.6).
Plugging (1.6) into the objective function of (1.5) yields B(s) = (1 + rB)s, where
rB  rL+(rL  rD). Now, notice that the only way to have a nite rB as !1 is if
rL = rD. Additionally, rB can also be written as rB = rD+(1+)
 
rL   rD. rL  rD
implies that rB  rD, with equality only as !1.
Now we will prove that both workers and bankers save in the rst period. The
reason for this is that these consumers have no source of income in the second period.
Lemma 2 characterizes the solution of (1.2) and (1.4).
Lemma 2. The solution of (1.2) is
sW(a) =

1 + 
(w + a): (1.7)
8The solution of (1.4) is
sB(a) =

1 + 
a: (1.8)
Proof. The rst order condition of (1.2) is
1
w + a  s =

s
:
Lemma 1 implies that the rst order condition of (1.4) can be written as
1
a  s =

s
:
Solving for s in (1.7) and (1.8) yields the result.
Finally we will characterize the solution of (1.3). Since entrepreneurs that borrow
and entrepreneurs that save face a dierent interest rate, there will be misallocation:
Firms with the same productivity have dierent sizes depending on the wealth of the
entrepreneur that manages them. The misallocation depends on the margin of interme-
diation.
Lemma 3. The solution of (1.3) is
l(z; a) =
8>>>><>>>>:

z
(1+rL)w
 1
1 
if a < EO;EL(z)

1+
a
w if EO;EL(z)  a < ED;EO(z)
z
(1+rD)w
 1
1 
if a  ED;EO(z)
sE(z; a) =
8>>>><>>>>:

1+a  1+1+

z
1+rL
 1
1   
w
 
1  if a < EO;EL(z)
0 if EO;EL(z)  a < ED;EO(z)

1+a  1+1+

z
1+rD
 1
1   
w
 
1  if a  ED;EO(z);
9where
ED;EO(z) 
1 + 


z
1 + rD
 1
1  
w
 
1 
EO;EL(z) 
1 + 


z
1 + rL
 1
1  
w
 
1 
:
Entrepreneurs with a < EO;EL(z) will borrow, entrepreneurs with a  ED;EO(z) will save
and entrepreneurs with EO;EL(z)  a < ED;EO(z) will spend all their available wealth in
paying for workers.
Proof. If s 6= 0 the rst order conditions of (1.3) can be written as
w
a  wl   s =
zl 1
zl + (1 + r)s
1
a  wl   s =
(1 + r)
zl + (1 + r)s
;
where r = rD if s > 0 and r = rL if s < 0. If s = 0 rst order conditions of (1.3) can
be written as
w
a  wl =

l
:
The proof of the Lemma follows from solving for s and l. The expressions for ED;EO(z)
and EO;EL(z) follow from analyzing when s > 0 or s < 0.
For the moment x w. Then there are two eects on entrepreneurs of having a
positive margin of intermediation: The larger this margin is, the bigger the range in
rm sizes for consumers with the same skill z across the spectrum of wealth a.
Wealthy entrepreneurs will have enough wealth to pay for their workers and save
the dierence. Due to this, the marginal cost of an employee will depend on rD. On
the other hand, unwealthy entrepreneurs need to borrow to pay for their workers, so
the marginal cost of an employee will depend on rL. Figure 1.1a highlights this point.
Additionally, a higher margin of intermediation implies that the dierence in wealth
between an entrepreneur that is able to save and an entrepreneur that borrows is higher.
In other words, holding w constant, a higher margin of intermediation implies a larger
dierence between ED;EO(z) and EO;EL(z). As a consequence less entrepreneurs use
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banks as nancial intermediaries, since more entrepreneurs use all their available wealth
to hire workers. See Figure1.1b for a graphical representation of this point.
Figure 1.1: Entrepreneur with skill z
(a) l(z; a)
δEO ,EL(z) δED ,EO(z) a
l(z, ·)
(b) sE(z; a)
0
δEO ,EL(z) δED ,EO(z)
a
s(z, ·)
Corollary 1 shows misallocation in a slightly dierent way. Let r(z; a) be the
marginal return of hiring l(z; a) workers. This return will be decreasing in the wealth of
the entrepreneur. r(z; a) is the opportunity cost of using wealth for hiring workers. If
an unwealthy entrepreneur uses one extra dollar to hire workers, he is borrowing more
and therefore is spending rL. On the other hand, an extra unit of wealth that a wealthy
entrepreneur spends on hiring workers could be used to get a return of rD if it was used
instead to save in a bank.
Corollary 1. Let r(z; a)  zl(z;a) 1w   1. Then
r(z; a) =
8>><>>:
rL if a < EO;EL(z)
z
 

w
 1+
a
1    1 if EO;EL(z)  a < ED;EO(z)
rD if a  ED;EO(z):
r(z; a) is continuous and decreasing in a.
With the results shown in Lemmas 2 and 3 we are able to determine the occupational
choice of consumers. In A.1 we determine explicitly the boundaries in skill and wealth
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that determine the occupational choice of consumers as a function of the prices in this
economy. That allows us to fully characterize each consumer, taking prices as given.
From Lemma 3 we conclude that within the set of entrepreneurs, wealthy en-
trepreneurs (high a) will be able to save and unwealthy entrepreneurs (low a) will
need to borrow. In general we nd that consumers with low wealth a and low skill z
will choose to become workers. The fact that these consumers have low skill makes it
better for them to work than to set up a rm. Additionally, their low wealth makes it
optimal for them to get an extra source of income in the rst period. The only way to
do this is by becoming a worker.
On the other hand, consumers with low skill and high wealth will become bankers.
Similar to workers, having a low skill level is a deterrent from becoming an entrepreneur.
Nonetheless, the high level of wealth makes it better for these consumers to set up
a bank, rather than to become workers, since rB > rD in equilibrium. Finally, en-
trepreneurs will be consumers with high skill. As shown in Lemma 3, the level of wealth
will aect the size of the rm that they manage.
It is worth mentioning that the occupational choice of consumers depends on their
wealth. Figure 1.2 shows graphically the dierent occupation choices of consumers in
(z; a) space.
Figure 1.2: Types of consumers depending on skill and wealth
W
B
E
z
a
B: Bankers. W: Workers. E : Entrepreneurs.
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1.4 Model with perfectly ecient banking sector
Contrast the model characterized in Section 1.3 with a model where the margin of
intermediation is 0. In this model there will only be an interest rate r. As mentioned in
Lemma 1, this can be achieved in the limit as  approaches innity. Recall from Lemma
1 that in this case rB = rL = rD, so only a consumer with innite wealth will be willing
to be a banker and this bank will be innitely leveraged and have 0 prots. We can
interpret this case as a model where consumers do not need a nancial intermediary to
get wealth from consumers that are willing to save to borrowing entrepreneurs. In this
case consumers choose whether to become entrepreneurs or workers. The utility of a
consumer endowed with skill level z and wealth a is given by
u(z; a) = max
O

uE(z; a); uW(a)
	
; (1.9)
where
uW(a) = max
s
ln c1 +  ln c2 (1.10)
c1 = w + a  s
c2 = (1 + r)s:
and
uE(z; a) = max
s;l
ln c1 +  ln c2 (1.11)
c1 = a  wl   s
c2 = zl
 + (1 + r)s:
In this case, entrepreneurs face the same interest rate, regardless if they borrow or
save. Workers, as before, will decide to save since they don't have any source of income
in the second period. An equilibrium for this economy is dened as follows.
Denition 2. An equilibrium for this economy is allocations xW(a)  fsW(a)g and
xE(z; a)  fl(z); sE(z; a)g, prices p  fw; rg and sets W and E such that
1. W and E are such that O(z; a) is a solution to (1.9) for all (z; a);
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2. given p, xW(a) is a solution to (1.10);
3. given p, xE(z; a) is a solution to (1.11);
4. and markets clear:
(a) Savings: Z
W
sW(a)dG(z  a) +
Z
E
sE(z; a)dG(z  a) = 0;
(b) labor: Z
W
dG(z  a) =
Z
E
l(z)dG(z  a);
(c) goods: Z
c1(z; a)dG(z  a) =
Z
adG(z  a))Z
c2(z; a)dG(z  a) =
Z
E
zl(z)dG(z  a):
Lemmas 4 and 5 characterize the solution to (1.10) and (1.11).
Lemma 4. The solution of (1.10) is
sW(a) =

1 + 
(w + a):
Proof. The rst order condition of (1.10) is
1
w + a  s =

s
:
Solving for s yields the result.
Lemma 5. The solution of (1.11) is
l(z) =

z
(1 + r)w
 1
1 
:
sE(z; a) =

1 + 
a  1 + 
1 + 

z
1 + r
 1
1  
w
 
1 
:
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Let
ED;EL(z) 
1 + 


z
1 + r
 1
1  
w
 
1 
:
Entrepreneurs will save if a  ED;EL(z) and borrow otherwise.
Proof. The rst order conditions of (1.11) can be written as
w
a  wl   s =
zl 1
zl + (1 + r)s
1
a  wl   s =
(1 + r)
zl + (1 + r)s
;
The proof of the Lemma follows from solving for s and l. The expression for ED;EL(z)
follows from analyzing when s > 0 or s < 0.
Notice that in this case the size of the rms does not depend on the wealth of the
entrepreneur. With the results shown in Lemmas 4 and 5 we are able to determine the
occupational choice of consumers. In A.2 we determine the explicit boundaries between
the two occupational choices of consumers as functions of w and r.
Since every consumer faces the same interest rate, the boundary that determines
the occupational choice between workers and entrepreneurs will not depend on the level
of wealth. Similar to Lucas (1978), the occupation choice depends exclusively on skill
level. Less skilled consumers will become workers since the consumption they get from
setting up a rm would be lower than consumption from working. Figure 1.3 shows a
graphical characterization of consumers in the (z; a) space.
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Figure 1.3: Types of consumers depending on skill and wealth
W E
z
a
W: Workers. E : Entrepreneurs.
We solve this model by stating and solving an equivalent Social Planner Problem
(See A.3).
1.5 Results
We rst prove a lemma that allows us to characterize labor remuneration in the model.
We then provide an example which allows us to get a closed form solution. Finally we
show some numerical results to highlight the main results of our model.
1.5.1 Labor remuneration is constant
Lemma 6 proves that labor remuneration in the model is constant.
Lemma 6. Let A be the total amount of wealth in the economy and denote the mass of
workers by MW . Then
wMW = A:
Proof. See A.4.
We give an overview of the proof of Lemma 6. Consider rst the case where wages
are paid in the same period as when production takes place. Given the production
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function of the rms in our model, it holds that wMW = Y , where Y denotes total
production. Now, in our model wages are paid in period 1, while production takes place
in period 2. Therefore the marginal cost of labor depends on interest rates. that is,
(1 + ~r)wMW = Y; (1.12)
where ~r is an average interest rate of the economy.1 Additionally, in our model total
consumption in the rst period is given by the total amount of wealth in the economy,
A, while total consumption in the second period equals total production, Y . Finally,
the fact that consumers have log utility implies the following aggregate Euler equation
Y = (1 + ~r)A: (1.13)
Plugging in (1.12) into (1.13) yields the result in the Lemma. Lemma 6 implies that the
eect of productivity aects wages indirectly through the measure of workers. In other
words, more productive economies will have higher wages since the measure of workers
will be smaller.
1.5.2 Example
We consider a particular distribution that allows us to nd a close form solution to
the model. Given constraints on parameters, we are able to abstract from changes in
occupational choice to focus on the main source of distortion; namely, the dierence in
size by rms with the same productivity. Finally we are able to derive an analytical
solution for total output and show that it is increasing in  since output decreases with
the margin of intermediation. The distribution we consider is specied in Denition 3.
Denition 3. Let eG() be the following distribution on z and a:
1. z takes values z1 and z2, with weights z and 1   z, respectively. We assume
z1 < z2.
2. For z = z1: a takes values a1 and a2, with weights a and 1  a, respectively. We
assume a1 < a2.
1Recall from the corollary to Lemma 3 that each type of entrepreneur faces a dierent interest rate
in this economy.
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3. For z = z2: Continuum of values of a distributed according to a uniform distribu-
tion between 0 and a.
Proposition 1 states the equilibrium prices and occupational choices in this economy.
The specic set of assumptions on parameters, as well as the proof of the proposition,
can be found in A.4.
Proposition 1. Given eG(),
w = 
aza1 + (1  a)za2 + (1  z)a2
az
1 + rL =
z2

(1 + )1 
 
az
aza1 + (1  a)za2 + (1  z)a2
!
1  z
2a(1 + )(1  a)za2
 1 
2
1 + rD =
z2

(1 + )1 
 
az
aza1 + (1  a)za2 + (1  z)a2
!

0B@ 1
1 

2
a(1 z)
 1
2  
(  )(1  a)za2   (1  z)a2   (1 + )aza1
 1
2
1CA
1 
and occupational choices
W = (z1; a1)
B = (z1; a2)
ED = f(z2; a) : ED;EO(z2)  a  ag
EO = f(z2; a) : EO;EL(z2)  a < ED;EO(z2)g
EL = f(z2; a) : 0  a < EO;EL(z2)g
are an equilibrium in this economy, where ED;EO(z), and EO;EL(z) are as dened in
Lemma 3.
Proof. See A.4.
The fact that the margin of intermediation is decreasing in  is a corollary to Propo-
sition 1.
Corollary 2. rL   rD is decreasing in .
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Additionally, we prove that the dierences in sizes for rms decreases as  increases.
Corollary 3. The dispersion in rm size is decreasing in .
Proof. The dispersion in sizes of rms is increasing in rL   rD.
Furthermore, from Proposition 1 we are able to derive an expression for total output
in this economy. Proposition 2 proves that total production is increasing in , since it
is decreasing in the margin of intermediation.
Proposition 2. Let
CL  1  z
2a(1 + )(1  a)za2
CD  1
1 

2
a(1 z)
 1
2  
(  )(1  a)za2   (1  z)a2   (1 + )aza1
 1
2
:
Then total output in this economy is equal to
Y = z2
1  z
a

1
1 + 
MW
A
 "
a

1
CD

  
1 + 
"
1
CD
1+
 

1
CL
 1+
2
##
Furthermore, an increase in  decreases the last term in Y , which is a function of
rL   rD.
Proof. See A.4.
1.5.3 Numerical solutions
We now solve the model numerically by assuming that z and a are drawn from inde-
pendent uniform distributions. We also set  = 0:7 and  = 0:96.2 We analyze what
happens as  increases. We nd that rL   rD is decreasing in . Additional to the
eect this has on the dispersion on the sizes of rms with the same productivity, we also
nd that there is an eect on occupational choice; namely, we observe that unskilled
consumers who choose to become entrepreneurs in economies with low levels of , will
choose to become workers as  increases. Also, skilled consumers who became workers
for low levels of , choose to manage rms for higher limits on the leverage of banks.
2The results we show hold qualitatively for various parameterizations.
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As  increases, the margin of intermediation goes down, which implies lower misallo-
cation: The heterogeneity in size among rms with same productivity decreases. Figure
1.4 shows what happens to misallocation as  increases. Figure 1.4a shows the eect
on rm size for an entrepreneur under dierent values of . As  ! 1 misallocation
disappears. Firms with the same productivity will have the same size, as the continuous
line shows. For nite values of , there will be misallocation.
Figure 1.4: Entrepreneur with skill z
(a) Firm size
λ → ∞
↓
λ = 2.3 →
← λ = 1.5
l(z, ·)
a
(b) Saving for entrepreneurs
0
λ→∞
ց
λ = 2.3 →
↑
λ = 1.5
s(z, ·)
a
Now, recall that the kinks in rm size correspond to values of a such that a = EO;EL
and a = ED;EO . A higher value of  implies a smaller dierence between EO;EL and
ED;EO . A consequence of a higher  is that more entrepreneurs use banks as nancial
intermediaries, since less entrepreneurs use all their available wealth to hire workers.
Figure 1.4b highlights this point: higher levels of  imply less entrepreneurs that neither
borrow nor save.
Furthermore, as  increases another distortion diminishes: Skilled consumers choose
to manage rms, while unskilled consumers become workers. That is, consumers that
choose to become entrepreneurs when  <1, choose to become workers when !1.
Similarly, consumers that choose to become workers when  < 1, decide to become
entrepreneurs when !1.
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Figure 1.5: Boundaries for dierent values of 
(a) !1
W E
z
a
(b)  = 4:00
W
B
E
z
a
(c)  = 2:33
W
B
E
z
a
(d)  = 1:5
W
B
E
z
a
B: Bankers. W: Workers. E : Entrepreneurs.
To understand the source of this distortion, Figure 1.6 shows the occupational choices
of consumers in the (z; a) space for dierent values of . As  increases the threshold
in wealth above which consumers prefer to become bankers over workers goes up. That
is, less workers become bankers. The main reason for why this occurs is that the spread
between rB and rD decreases, which is largely a consequence of the decrease in the
margin of intermediation.
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Figure 1.6: Changes in occupational choice
(a) Skilled consumers become entrepreneurs...
W
B
E
z
a
(b) ... and unskilled consumers become workers
W
B
E
z
a
B: Bankers. W: Workers. E : Entrepreneurs.
More importantly, as  increases, the slope of the the boundary that determines the
occupation choice between workers and entrepreneurs increases. That is, the decision
between becoming a worker or an entrepreneur becomes less dependent on the level
of wealth of the consumer than on its skill. Given that the margin of intermediation
is decreasing in , Lemma 7 shows this by proving that in an economy with  < 1
an unwealthy consumer needs to have a higher skill than a wealthy consumer in order
to become an entrepreneur. Furthermore, this dierence is increasing in the margin
of intermediation. We prove the lemma for a particular case in which the minimum
value that a attains is 0. Nonetheless the result holds for any general distribution with
positive support.
Lemma 7. A consumer with wealth above a1 =
1+
(1 )w will become an entrepreneur
as long as z  z1 where
z1 

1
1  
1  1


w(1 + rD):
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A consumer with no wealth (a = 0) will become an entrepreneur as long as z  z2 where
z2 

1
1  
1  1


w(1 + rL)

1 + rD
1 + rL
(1 )
1+
:
z2 > z1 as long as r
L   rD > 0. Furthermore, z2   z1 is decreasing in .
Figure 1.7: Production relative to economy with  = 9
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Proof. See A.4.
Figure 1.6 shows the eect of the distortion on occupation choice. Figure 1.6a
shows consumers who choose to become entrepreneurs in an economy without limits
on leverage ( ! 1) but in the model with  < 1 choose to become workers. That
is, without limits on leverage these consumers choose to manage rms since they are
skilled consumers. However, these consumers have low wealth. If they chose to become
entrepreneurs when  <1, they would need to nance a large portion of their wage bill
by borrowing. Therefore, in an economy with  < 1 they are better o by becoming
workers.
On the other hand, Figure 1.6b shows the consumers that would choose to become
entrepreneurs in an economy with limits on leverage ( < 1). These consumers are
wealthy enough to be able to nance a signicant share of their wage bill without needing
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to borrow. As  increases, these consumers are better o becoming workers, since they
are not skilled enough.
The increased distortions mentioned before cause production to be lower for low
levels of . Figure 1.7 shows how production is increasing in . In this gure we compare
the production in an economy with a given level of  relative to the production of an
economy with  = 9. With the current parametrization we are able to explain up to
56% dierences in production.
We also analyze what happens as we change other parameters in the model. In
particular, we analyze what happens as we change the ratio of wealth to skill in the
model. That is, let a be the supremum of the support of the distribution for wealth
and let z be the equivalent for skill. We analyze changes in az for a given value of  and
holding other parameters constant. We nd that distortions of having limits on leverage
decrease: As this ratio increases, consumers are wealthier in the rst period, relative
to the second period. This implies that interest rates will be lower in equilibrium since
there is more wealth that is going to be saved and less will be borrowed. Furthermore,
banks become bigger, which causes the margin of intermediation to be lower.
1.6 Data
The objective of this section is to highlight that data supports the mechanism we men-
tion in the model. That is, there is a negative correlation between the margin of interme-
diation and production. Additionally, we document that the margin of intermediation
is negatively correlated with nancial inclusion, where nancial inclusion is dened as
the percentage of rms that rely on banks to nance their working capital. This is
consistent with the results in the model since a lower margin of intermediation implies
that the measure of rms that borrow from banks increases.
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Table 1.1: Production vs margin of intermediation
Dependent Variable: log GDP per capita
Margin of intermediation  0:880
(0:072)
Number of observations 2,886
OLS estimation. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
***: Signicant at 1%.
Country xed eects.
We use data from the Global Financial Development Database (GFDD). This is an
extensive database that includes measures of nancial development for over 200 countries
from 1960 to 2010.3 The measures are divided in metrics of depth, access, eciency and
stability of the nancial markets in order to analyze the dierent roles that nancial
systems play in an economy. See Cihak, Demirguc-Kunt, Feyen, and Levine (2012) for
a further description of the database.
Table 1.2: Financial inclusion vs margin of intermediation
Dependent Variable: Financial inclusion
Margin of intermediation  1:117
(0:599)
Number of observations 134
OLS estimation. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
*: Signicant at 10%.
Country xed eects.
We only consider countries whose population has been above 1,000,000 at some point
in time and we estimate the following econometric model:
GDPi;t = 1 + 2MIi;t + i + "i;t:
We dene GDPi;t as the natural logarithm of GDP per capita in 2000 US dollars. MI is
the margin of intermediation, dened in the database as the bank-lending deposit spread.
We include country xed eects to control for other country specic characteristics.
3Some variables are available for a shorter span of time.
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Table 1.1 shows the results of the estimation. We observe that there is a negative
correlation between the margin of intermediation and the GDP per capita. An increase
of a percentage point in the margin of intermediation results in a decrease of 0:9%
in GDP per capita. This is consistent with the results shown in Erosa (2001) and
Greenwood, Sanchez, and Wang (2013).
We then test other implications of the model; namely, as the margin of intermedia-
tion decreases more rms rely on the banking sector to nance their wage bill. For this
we estimate (1.14):
FIi;t = 1 + 2MIi;t + i + "i;t: (1.14)
We dene FI as the percentage of rms that use banks to nance working capital,
which we denote as nancial inclusion. Cihak, Demirguc-Kunt, Feyen, and Levine
(2012) compiled this measure from the Enterprise Surveys, which are surveys conducted
by the World Bank to emerging countries (See The World Bank (2012) for further
details). As mentioned in Cihak, Demirguc-Kunt, Feyen, and Levine (2012), nancial
development is positively correlated with income. Therefore, it is safe to assume that
rms that don't rely on banks to nance their working capital are most likely not able
to use nancial markets to save either. Table 1.2 shows the result of the estimation
of (1.14). We document a negative correlation between nancial inclusion and the
margin of intermediation: a one percent increase in the margin of intermediation reduces
the percentage of rms using banks to nance their working capital by 1:1%. This is
consistent with the results of our model: as the margin of intermediation decreases, the
measure of rms that borrow from banks increases.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the relationship between the leverage of banks and real allocations.
Economies with banks that have a lower leverage experience a higher margin of interme-
diation, which aects both the occupational choices of consumers and the distribution
of rm sizes across the wealth of individuals. When the margin of intermediation is
large, wealthy entrepreneurs can hire workers for a signicantly lower cost relative to
unwealthy entrepreneurs. This variation in marginal costs of employees translates into
heterogeneity in rm sizes across the spectrum of wealth for otherwise identical rms.
26
Occupational choice is also distorted: consumers with substantial skill but suciently
small wealth may be dissuaded from managing rms due to the large costs of taking
out loans, whereas wealthy but less skilled consumers may manage rms due to their
relative advantage in inexpensive nancing and the low opportunity cost of using those
funds to hire workers rather than depositing. Future work will focus on analyzing the
tradeo of having limits on the leverage of banks in an economy with risk.
Chapter 2
Public Law Enforcement: More Is
not Always Better
2.1 Introduction
Property rights, or namely, the ability of rms and consumers to own capital and other
resources are essential to almost every economic model. However, for the most part these
rights are taken as given. A walk through the streets in an urban area of virtually any
developing country reveals that this is not the case. Private security guards, metal bars
and large locks are commonplace to counteract high levels of theft. Economists have
remained largely silent on the discussion of theft and how to counteract it even though
it is important for policymakers. In this paper we propose a general equilibrium model
that includes theft, private security and public law enforcement and is motivated by
qualitative patterns observed in the World Bank's Enterprise Surveys and Government
Indicators. In particular, the model we propose highlights the direct and general equi-
librium responses by agents in their private security and theft decisions to changes in
the level of public law enforcement.
The level of public law enforcement is drastically dierent across countries, with
police force and incarceration rates varying by a factor of 100.1 We provide a theory of
why this is the case. Namely, we nd that the marginal eects of changes in public law
1Source: http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/worldbrief/
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enforcement are very dierent depending on the current level of public law enforcement.
Further, there are a number of non-monotonicities in the relationship between public
law enforcement and variables of interest. Finally, the combined direct and indirect
eects of the level of public law enforcement can aect the aggregate production in a
country by as much as 6%.
According to our model, in economies with relatively low levels of public law en-
forcement, a marginal rise in the level can actually lower aggregate production. This
happens since an increase in public law enforcement increases the incarceration rate,
which removes agents from the labor force. Additionally, we observe a high level of sub-
stitution between public law enforcement and expenditures on private security which
dampens the eect public law enforcement has on the overall level of theft. Finally, there
is a general equilibrium eect which lowers the relative income of the non-incarcerated
agents through the increased burden of supporting those who are incarcerated. This
also pushes some agents to become thieves. To put this in perspective, using our bench-
mark model, if the level of public law enforcement in Guatemala improved to the level
in Mexico, we would predict a decrease in aggregate production of 0:33%.
We also observe that private security exerts a negative externality in economies
with low levels of publics law enforcement. If we consider equilibria where rms can
only hire a fraction of the private security that they would otherwise nd optimal, then
production is hiring than if rms were able to hire their optimal level of private security.
The reason for this is that by restricting how much rms can spend on private security,
rms end up hiring more workers.
For high enough levels of public law enforcement, we nd that marginal increases
in the level of public law enforcement provide large gains to aggregate production and
increase the labor force. As the probability of getting caught rises, agents are deterred
from stealing and at some point the drop in theft becomes larger than the increase in
those thieves who are caught. The reduction in incarceration rates augments the total
labor force which increases total production. Additionally, reduction in theft from rms
lowers the distortionary wedge between the marginal product of labor and the wage rate
which rises both the eciency and average size of rms. Finally, the increase in the
wage rate and the reduction in the burden of the incarcerated on the non-incarcerated
increases the actual cost of getting caught and puts further downward pressure on the
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theft rate. Again using our benchmark model, if the level of public law enforcement in
Mexico improved to the level of that in the United States, we would predict an increase
in aggregate production of 2:58%.
Data which exists for private security consistently reveals that the correlation be-
tween private security expenditures and theft is positive. We match this fact. In our
model this relation is caused by public law enforcement which both deters theft and
serves as a substitute for private security. In this sense, we make the same empirical
observation as North (1968) in that economies where rms have lower private security
expenditures are also economies with less theft and often higher production.
In order to direct and validate the way we model the decision of thieves in when
and how much to steal, and the way we model private security, we adopt two strategies.
First we incorporate existing ndings on theft in the psychology and sociology literature.
Second we allow agents to vary across two dimensions: by aversion to theft and by
varying levels of ability as in the Lucas (1978) span of control model. Granting variation
across these dimensions gives insight into micro decisions of agents and across rms. We
validate our modeling of theft and private security by matching these patterns to the
data.
Heterogenous modeling of agents also gives further insights. Specically, agents
with lower ability earn less which decreases their cost of being caught and increases the
likelihood they engage in theft. Second, the distortion from theft across rms is not
uniform. Firms managed by entrepreneurs with higher ability aord larger amounts of
private security which reduce the wedge between the marginal productivity of labor and
the wage rate. This mechanism causes the dispersion across rm size to be increasing
in the rate of theft.
As far as we are aware, we present the rst general equilibrium model incorporating
theft, private security and public law enforcement. However, our work contributes and
builds upon a vast theoretical and empirical literature.
Our paper continues in the spirit of the seminal work by Becker (1968). In our
model consumers analyze the costs and benets of committing a crime and make a
rational decision of whether to engage in criminal activity. Perhaps the model most
similar to ours is the one in Fender (1999) which includes many of the same elements
and some of the same results. In that model, corruptible agents choose between work
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and theft and there is consideration of the level of enforcement which is very similar
to our notion of public law enforcement. In line with this paper, we observe similar
relationships between the level of enforcement, the number of criminals and the number
punished. We also observe the possibility of multiple equilibria which is consistent with
both Fender (1999) and Burdett, Lagos, and Wright (2003). That is, suppose there
are lots of high wage jobs available. Then workers are less inclined to criminal activity
which makes the higher wage sustainable. If no such jobs are available, workers are
more inclined to criminal activity which keeps wages low. In contrast to Fender (1999),
our model allows thieves to both work and steal, we include a notion of rms, agents
are heterogenous in ability and we incorporate general equilibrium eects. This allows
us to match micro data in order to validate our macro results.
Our ndings are consistent with the ndings in the empirical paper by Buonanno,
Drago, Galbiati, and Zanella (2011). Their work suggests that increases in the incarcer-
ation rate deters crime. In our model we support that this eect holds, but the general
equilibrium eects can cause pressure on crime (specically theft) in both directions.
Due to the current absence of dynamics in our model, we are unable to address the
(largely empirical) literature on the deterrents of the eects of prison on recidivism.2
Our paper is also related to the existing literature relating trust, extortion, distortion
and rm size. We observe a similar pattern in distribution of rm size due to increases
in theft as Ranasinghe (2012) observes from increases in extortion in the sense that
higher levels increase dispersion of rm size. Our eects dier slightly in that all rms
are smaller than they would be in the absence of theft but the distortion is greatest
for the smallest rms. We also incorporate from Grobovsek (2013) the nding that
increased levels of theft among workers constrains rm size through ineective contract
enforcement.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents an empirical
motivation for our model and the main mechanism in it. Section 2.3 outlines the model.
Section 2.4 presents the primary results. Section 2.5 concludes.
2See Drago, Galbiati, and Vertova (2009) for an example.
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2.2 Data and Empirical Motivation
In order to validate the mechanisms used and the implied predictions of our model,
we employ data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys and Worldwide Governance
Indicators. The surveys are conducted at the rm level using a representative sample
of an economy's private sector. The World Bank selected rms for the Enterprise
Surveys using stratied random sampling. All members of the population have the same
probability of being sampled and no weighting of the observations is necessary. However,
only rms with 5 or more employees are targeted for an interview and organizations with
100% government ownership are ineligible to participate.3 Surveys occur face-to-face
with business owners and top managers.
Surveys have been conducted every year from 2006 to 2011. Nonetheless, in any
single country there have been a maximum of two surveys and the vast majority of
countries have been surveyed a single time. The nal dataset used in this paper includes
130 country-years and averages 373 rms interviewed per country-year combination for
a total of 48,436 observations. There are 111 unique countries where surveys have
been conducted. Questions are both qualitative and quantitative in nature. Qualitative
questions ask perception of certain business obstacles (e.g. \Do you perceive crime, theft
and disorder as a major constraint?"). Quantitative questions of particular relevance
request the number of employees, the annual revenue, the amount of annual losses due
to theft as well as annual private security expenditures.
Summary statistics are included in Table 2.1. Crime is identied as a \major"
constraint by over a quarter of all rms interviewed. Additionally, even though only
roughly a quarter of rms directly experienced theft in the year of interview, almost
two thirds of rms have positive expenditures on private security. The average security
expenditures for rms purchasing private security was 2:6% of total revenues. Firms
which experienced theft had an average loss equivalent to 3:8% of their total revenues.
3The sample targets rms they believe to have 5 or more employees, however some rms are observed
to have less than 5 upon conducting the interview.
32
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Share of rms that perceive theft as a major constraint 27.8%
Share of rms that had positive expenditures on private security 63.9%
Average private security expenditures* $59,931
Average private security expenditures over revenue** 2.6%
Firms that experienced theft 24.7%
Average level of theft* $18,786
Average theft over revenue*** 3.8%
*: Levels were converted to 2000 US dollars.
**: Conditional on having positive private security expenditures.
***: Conditional on having experienced theft.
Source: The World Bank (2012). Authors' calculations.
We now make a number of motivating observations where we highlight how the
level of public law enforcement is important in determining theft and private security
choices in equilibrium. Figure 2.1 shows average experienced theft to average private
security expenditures at the country level. We observe that average theft is positively
correlated with average private security expenditures and the relationship is signicant
at the 1% level. We assume that all else constant, theft should decrease in security
expenditures. However, both theft and security decisions are endogenous to the envi-
ronment. Therefore the observed positive correlation is not causal but is indicative of
some tertiary eect. We posit that one of the key drivers of this relationship is public
law enforcement. First, as seen in Figure 2.2a, security is decreasing in the country's
Rule of Law index4 which we use as a proxy for public law enforcement. Second, theft
is also decreasing in public law enforcement as seen in Figure 2.2b. This additional
information seems to support private security being an imperfect substitute for public
law enforcement and that a rm's equilibrium private security decision does not fully
compensate for the lack of a strong public law enforcement presence.
4The World Bank establishes six governance indicators, one of which is a Rule of Law Index which
orders countries according to the overall rule of law. See Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2010) for
a description of the methodology used to calculate these indicators. According to the World Bank
denition, \The Rule of Law index captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have condence
in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property
rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence". We use the percentile
of this index as a proxy for the level of public law enforcement in a given country.
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Figure 2.1: Theft over Revenue vs Security Expenditures over Revenue
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Figure 2.2: Security Expenditures over Revenue (Sec to Rev) and Theft over Revenue
(Theft to Rev) vs Rule of Law
(a) Sec to Rev vs Rule of Law
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(b) Theft to Rev vs Rule of Law
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Source: The World Bank (2012). Authors' calculations.
We observe a hump-shaped relationship between rule of law and incarceration rates.
For low levels of public law enforcement, we observe that increases in this level are
accompanied by an increase in the incarceration rate. However, once the level of public
law enforcement reaches a certain point, further increases are actually related to lower
incarceration rates. Table 2.2 shows both a linear and quadratic t when regressing the
incarceration rate on the Rule of Law. We observe that incarceration rates appear to be
increasing in the Rule of Law. Nonetheless, when we add a quadratic Rule of Law term
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the coecient on the rst term becomes ve times larger and increases in signicance.
Additionally the goodness of t more than doubles. Both of these support the use of a
quadratic term and that the hump shape in incarceration rates matches data better.
Table 2.2: Incarceration as a function of Rule of Law (RoL)
Dependant variable is Incarceration Rate
(1) (2)
Constant 112:807 54:051
(13:991) (20:537)
RoL 0:802 4:250
(0:239) (0:936)
RoL2  0:0340
(0:009)
Observations 199 199
R2 0.054 0.119
OLS estimation. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
***: Signicant at 1%.
Our nal motivating observation is that we observe average rm size to be inversely
correlated with average theft, and this relation is also signicant at the 1% level. Figure
2.3 shows this relation. A similar observation was made by Grobovsek (2013).
Figure 2.3: Average Size of Firm vs Average Theft over Revenue
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To conclude, we nd suggestive evidence that the level of public law enforcement
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is important in the determination of equilibrium theft and private security choices.
Perhaps more importantly, eects on incarceration from marginal changes in the level
of public law enforcement will vary based on the current level of public law enforcement.
2.3 Environment
Our model is constructed in the spirit of Lucas (1978). Each consumer makes two
choices: whether to become a thief or not, and whether to become an entrepreneur or a
worker. Consider a particular consumer. If she chooses to become a thief, she optimally
chooses how much to steal from rms, taking as given how much security is hired by
each rm. However, she faces an exogenous probability of getting caught and losing
what she stole as well as the ability to work or manage a rm. If the consumer decides
to become an entrepreneur, she takes into account how much theft she faces and chooses
how much security to hire, in addition to choosing the optimal size of her rm. If she
becomes a worker, then she works in rms in exchange for a wage.
2.3.1 Consumers
In this economy there is a unit mass continuum of risk neutral consumers, each endowed
with a skill level and an aversion to steal. Consider a consumer with skill level z and
aversion to steal . She maximizes her utility, given by (2.1).
u(z; ) = max fuT (z; ); uNT (z)g ; (2.1)
where
uT (z; ) = (1  ) [max fw; (z)g+T  ] + c  
uNT (z) = max fw; (z)g  :
That is, she decides whether to become a thief and get utility uT (z; ) or not become a
thief and get uNT (z). In the former case, the consumer steals from rms to get an extra
income of T . She gets away with stealing with an exogenous probability 1  . With
probability  the consumer gets caught and loses all sources of income. Instead she
receives consumption c. We interpret  2 [0; 1] as the level of public law enforcement
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and we interpret a thief being caught as implying that she goes to jail. In this way, if
a consumer is caught, she neither works nor becomes an entrepreneur. Finally,  is a
lump sum tax on consumers that do not go to jail which nances c for those in jail.
That is,
 =
cMT
1  MT : (2.2)
Regardless of the decision to become a thief, the consumer also decides whether to
work for a wage w or become an entrepreneur and receive the prots (z) from the rm
she manages. If she becomes an entrepreneur her income will depend on her skill z. If
the consumer decides not to become a thief, she receives the income either from working
or from being an entrepreneur, minus the lump sum tax.
We assume that  and z are drawn from independent distributions. We will denote
by F () and G() the cumulative distribution functions of  and z, respectively. A
consumer's decision is characterized by z and , so we will denote each agent by the
realizations of these random variables.
2.3.2 Firms, theft and private security
Consider an entrepreneur with skill level z. She maximizes the prots from the rm she
manages, which we will denote as rm z, by hiring workers ly to maximize its prots.
The rms produces using a decreasing returns to scale function, zly , where  2 (0; 1).
From what rm z produces (1  )MT  gets stolen, where MT denotes the measure of
consumers that become thieves and  is how much each thief decides to steal from rm
z.5 Finally, rm z can hire security guards ls to diminish theft. All rms produce the
same nal good and we normalize the price of this good to 1. To summarize, rm z
solves problem (2.3).
(z)  max
ly0;ls0
zly   wly   wls   (1  )MT (z): (2.3)
In order to determine how many security guards are hired, we assume rm z under-
stands the thieves' problem. Consider the problem of a consumer that becomes a thief
5Since agents are risk averse we are able to abstract from which rms are stolen from and only care
about the expected level of theft.
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and decides to steal from rm z. The income derived in stealing from rm z is given by
T (z)  max
0
   C (z); (2.4)
where C (z) denotes the cost born by those who steal from rm z. We make three
assumptions regarding this cost. First, C (z) is increasing and convex in the amount
stolen. The more that is stolen, the greater the transportation costs, storage costs,
etc. Additionally, without convexity, thieves would always attempt to steal everything
possible or steal nothing at all which does not hold true empirically. Moreover, the
thieves' problem does not solely consider the nancial costs but also the utility costs of
time and anguish involved in planning and carrying out an operation. It is reasonable
that the cost of theft in terms of planning, stress, and time grows exponentially from
stealing a pack of gum to stealing everything in a store.
Our second assumption is that security aects the choice of theft by making it more
costly to steal. The presence of a security guard in the rm causes more planning and
time in order to be able to steal. This is consistent with what is found by Kraut (1976)
where the risk associated with stealing is perceived as a deterrent.
Finally, we assume that the cost of stealing is decreasing in the amount produced
by the rm. This accounts for the fact that if a rm is bigger, then there are more
things to steal, and so stealing the same amount as from a smaller rm is easier. This
is consistent with the results reported by Smigel (1956), who nds that people are more
likely to steal from big rms than from small rms.
We assume that C (z)  (ls(z))ly(z) 
2
2 , where  (ls) 


1  ls
 1 

denotes how much
security ls guards provide for a given level of MT and is strictly increasing and concave
in ls. The solution to (2.4) is
(z) =
ly(z)
 (ls(z))
: (2.5)
Then T (z) =
1
2(z) and the aggregate income received from stealing T is given
by
T 
Z
(z;)2E
T (z)dF ()dG(z)  
Z
(z;)2ETT T (z)dF ()dG(z); (2.6)
where E and T denote the set of consumers that become entrepreneurs and the set of
38
consumers that become thieves, respectively. That is,
E  f(z; ) : (z)  wg (2.7)
T  f(z; ) : uT (z; ) > uNT (z)g : (2.8)
We abuse notation and also refer to E as the set of z for which consumers become
entrepreneurs. The use of E will be clear from context.
The second term in (2.6) is due to the fact that thieves do not get income when
stealing from the rms managed by entrepreneurs that are thieves and get caught.
Recall that a fraction  of the total entrepreneurs that become thieves go to jail and
unable to manage rms.
2.3.3 Micro Support for Modeling Theft and Private Security
We use the existing literature as well as qualitative patterns in micro-data to motivate
our modeling methods. Specically we make four observations using data from the
Enterprise Surveys (See Table 2.3). First, both the absolute level of theft and private
security expenditures are increasing across rm size. This is consistent with Smigel
(1956).
Table 2.3: Results in Theft and Security Across Firms
Dependent Variable: Theft TheftRevenue Security
Security
Revenue
Security
Revenue
Security>0
Revenue
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Size (Labor) 224:14 613:99
(12:45) (42:86)
Size (log Labor)  0:002 0:001 0:004  0:003
(0:000) (0:000) (0:001) (0:000)
Size (log Labor2)  0:000
(0:000)
Observations 48; 299 48,299 48; 299 48; 299 48; 299 30; 838
Country-Year Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
OLS estimation. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
***: Signicant at 1%. **: Signicant at 5%. *: Signicant at 10%.
Next we analyze these same variables as a share of revenue. While theft is increasing
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in the size of rm, theft as a percentage of revenue is decreasing in the size of rm.
The relation with private security expenditures is slightly more complicated. When we
regress private security expenditures as a share of revenues we nd that the share is
increasing slowly in the size of rm. However, when we add a quadratic term on size
to the regression we nd a hump shape, with private security share increasing for small
rms and decreasing for larger rms. Another level of analysis reveals the cause for
this hump. The probability that a rm purchases private security is increasing in size.
However, given a rm purchases private security (column 6 of Table 2.3), the share of
revenue spent on private security is decreasing in the size of rm.
These micro patterns were used to guide our modeling of private security and theft.
To the extent possible, given the level of heterogeneity used in our model, we match
these patterns for a large range of . Figure 2.4d matches the data in column 6 of Table
2.3. Due to the level of heterogeneity it is not within the scope of our model to exactly
match the hump shape found in the data.
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Figure 2.4: Matching Micro Patterns
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(c) Security vs Size
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(d) Security Share vs Size
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2.3.4 Equilibrium
An equilibrium in this economy is allocations f(z); ly(z); ls(z)gz2E , wages w, and sets
E and T such that
1. (z) satises (2.5) for all z 2 E; and ly(z) and ls(z) solve (2.10);
2. E and T satisfy (2.7) and (2.8);
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3. the labor market clears:Z
(z;)2E
(ly(z) + ls(z)) dF ()dG(z) 
Z
(z;)2ETT (ly(z) + ls(z)) dF ()dG(z)
=
Z
(z;)2Ec
dF ()dG(z) 
Z
(z;)2EcTT dF ()dG(z);
4. and the good market clears:
Y 
Z
(z;)2E
zly(z)
dF ()dG(z)  
Z
(z;)2ETT zly(z)dF ()dG(z)
=
Z
(z;)2E
[w (ly(z) + ls(z)) + (z) + (1  )(z)MT ] dF ()dG(z)
 
Z
(z;)2ETT [w (ly(z) + ls(z)) + (z) + (1  )(z)MT ] dF ()dG(z);
where
MT 
Z
(z;)2T
dF ()dG(z):
2.3.5 Characterizing of the equilibrium
Lemma 8 characterizes E and T .
Lemma 8.
E =

(z; ) : z  zE	
T =

(z; ) : z < zE and  < W
	[
(z; ) : z  zE and  < E(z)	 ;
where zE is the unique value of z such that (zE) = w and
W  c
1  MT + (1  )T   w
E(z)  c
1  MT + (1  )T   (z):
Proof. The production function of every rm satises Inada conditions, so ly(z) > 0
for all z 2 E. Now, the Envelope Theorem, (2.10) and the assumptions on  imply
0(z) = ly(z)

1  (1 )MTa(ls(z)jMT )

> 0. Additionally, limz!0 (z)  0. Also, (z) < w
42
for all z cannot be an equilibrium since in this case there would be no entrepreneurs.
On the other hand, from (2.8), (z; ) 2 T if and only if uT (z; ) > uNT (z). From
(2.1) and (2.2) we have that (z; ) 2 T if and only if
c
1  MT + (1  )T   max fw; (z)g > : (2.9)
The denition of zE and (2.9) imply the result.
From Lemma 8 we see that thieves are those agents who have the lowest levels of skill
and the lowest aversion to steal. Since income is increasing in skill, we also observe that
those with the smallest incomes are the most likely to become thieves. We note that
these results are consistent with both the theoretical and empirical existing literature.6
Figure 2.5 shows E and T across skill (x-axis) and aversion to steal (y-axis).
Figure 2.5: E and T across Skill and Aversion to Steal
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As mentioned, rm z knows (2.5). Therefore the rm's problem can be written as
6For example see Freeman (1999).
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stated in (2.10).
(z) = max
ly0;ls0
zly  

(1  )MT
 (ls)
+ w

ly   wls: (2.10)
Lemma 9 characterizes the demand for labor and security given wages w, as well as
rms prots and how much is stolen from each rm.
Lemma 9. Assume  > 0:5. Then
ly(z) =

z
w
 

(1  )MT
w
 11 
ls(z) =
1  


(1  )MT
w
z
w
 

(1  )MT
w
 1 
(z) =
1  

w

z
w
 

(1  )MT
w
 11 
(z) =

w
(1  )MT
1 z
w
 

(1  )MT
w
 1 
:
Proof. See B.1.
Now, notice from (2.10) that the production function satises Inada conditions, so
ly(z) > 0 for every rm. We assume that  > 0:5 so that () is strictly concave and rst
order conditions with respect to ls are also sucient. Using the fact that the solution is
always interior, taking rst order conditions of the right hand side of (2.10) with respect
to ly yields
w +
(1  )MT
 (ls(z))
= zl 1y : (2.11)
In the absence of theft (i.e. MT = 0) (2.11) reduces to w = zl
 1
y , or ly =
 
z
w
 1
1  .
We observe that theft creates a wedge which causes the marginal productivity of labor
to be greater than w by a factor of (1 )MT(ls(z)) . Observe that the wedge is increasing in
the measure of thieves and decreasing in both a higher level of public law enforcement
and private security. As a consequence of theft, rms are smaller in equilibrium than
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in the absence of theft:
z
w
 

(1  )MT
w
 11 
<
z
w
 1
1 
:
Corollary 4 shows that the ratio of theft experienced by a rm to private security
expenditures is constant and greater than 1.
Corollary 4. The ratio of theft experienced by a rm, (1   )MT (z), and private
security expenditures, wls(z), is constant and equal to

1  .
Proposition 3 shows every rm nds it optimal to hire security.
Proposition 3. Assume  > 0:5. Then ls(z) > 0 for all z  zE.
Proof. By denition zE is such that (zE) = w. From the expression for (z) in Lemma
(9),
zE =
w1 

((1  )MT ) +

1
1  
1  1


w
and ls(z) > 0 if and only if z >
w1 
 ((1  )MT ). Since zE > w
1 
 ((1  )MT ),
the result follows.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Parameterization
Our current parametrization is chosen such that reasonable parameter values are able
to give results which qualitatively match the micro and macro patterns we observe in
the data. Table 2.4 shows the values of the parameters that we use and the moments
we target.
We calibrate preference and technology parameters to match key aspects of the US
economy. Our model economy consists of eight parameters. In accordance with Buera,
Kaboski, and Shin (2011) we assume that entrepreneurial ability is Pareto distributed
with shape parameter  and scale parameter z. Since Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2011)
also t their model to the US economy, we adopt  = 4:84 from their paper. We
set the nominal Pareto scale parameter z at 1 for simplicity. The distribution for
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preference on theft is assumed to be uniformly distributed and is characterized by 
and . We calibrate these parameters to fall within a reasonable range given annual
reported property crimes and the percentage of US citizens with a criminal record.7
We calibrate c, public expenditure on the incarcerated, by matching the costs per
prisoner relative to average income.8 Parameter  is the returns to scale of the pro-
duction function. We choose  to target an eective return to scale  of 0:85, which is
commonly used in the literature.9
Finally, we choose , the level of public law enforcement, and the extra degree of
freedom we have from the distribution function on  to match inventory shrinkage and
loss prevention expenditures as a percentage of revenue from retail rms, as reported
by the 2011 National Retail Security Survey.
Table 2.4: Calibration - Parametrization
Moment Data Model Parameter
Consumption Expenditure per Criminal 0.37 0:37 c = 0:36
Loss Prevention Expenditures 0.35% 0:35%  = 0:82
Criminal Record 3.1%-27.8% 5:00%  = 4:00
Inventory Shrinkage 1.42% 1:42%  =  0:69
Returns to Scale 0.85 0:80  = 0:80
Pareto Shape Parameter 4.84 4:84  = 4:84
2.4.2 Macro Results
The primary result of our paper is that changes to the level of public law enforcement
have dierent eects depending on the current level of public law enforcement. In Figure
2.6a we observe that for low levels of public law enforcement, increases to this level can
actually decrease the amount of total production. When we compare the model to the
data the pattern is quite similar; however, we only account for a relatively small portion
of the dierences in GDP across countries due to dierences in public law enforcement.
7The National Employment Law Project estimates that 27.8% of US adults have a criminal record.
On the other hand the FBIs UCR Program reports a property crime rate of 3.1% in 2009.
8According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, as citetd in the report \Public Safety, Public Spend-
ing" prepared by the Public Safety Performance Project, the marginal cost per prisoner was $13,797 in
2005. On the other hand the Social Security Administration reports an Average Wage Index in 2005 of
$36,953. We choose c so that c
w
= $13;797
$36;953
= :37.
9See Khan and Thomas (2013) or Ranasinghe (2012) for other papers using a similar number.
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Small increases in the level of public law enforcement cause a decrease in GDP for
those countries with low levels of public law enforcement. Countries with higher levels
of public law enforcement demonstrate a positive correlation between per capita GDP
and the level of public law enforcement. Finally, we note that the eect of public law
enforcement on aggregate production can be as large as 6:02%.
Figure 2.6: Total Production vs Public LE
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In Figure 2.6b Y refers to the GDP per capita (PPP) of 2010. Source: World Bank. Authors' calcula-
tions.
We explain the primary mechanism for this result with Figure 2.7a. Recall from
Table 2.2 the non-monotonicity in the incarceration rate. Our model produces the same
pattern as we vary the level of public law enforcement holding all other parameters from
the benchmark model xed as shown in Figure 2.7a. The result can be explained rather
intuitively. If we think of the incarceration rate as a rectangle with the vertical axis
representing the level of public law enforcement , which in our model also represents
the percentage of thieves who are caught, and the horizontal axis as the measure of
people who steal MT , then the incarceration rate is simply the area of this rectangle.
In the benchmark model we observe that @MT@ < 0. At some point the decrease in the
measure of thieves outweighs the increase in the percentage of thieves who are caught.
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This concept is visually represented in Figure 2.7b.10
Figure 2.7: Incarceration
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Figure 2.8 splits production into four categories, two of which are security and theft.
The security line represents the total cost in nal good paid to private security workers.
The theft line represents the total value of goods stolen. When we look at these two
variables across the level of public law enforcement we see that they match Figures 2.2a
and 2.2b. While private security expenditures directly reduce theft, in equilibrium rms
hire more private security and more agents choose to engage in theft when there is less
public law enforcement. In this sense, public law enforcement directly reduces theft,
but it also acts as a substitute for private security expenditures, which indirectly puts
an upward pressure on theft. If policymakers fail to consider this indirect eect, they
10While the levels shown in this gure are quite large relative to incarceration rates observed in
the United States, the idea is that increasing public law enforcement causes workers to be removed (or
possibly misallocated) from the labor force. Multiple studies have been conducted to review the measure
of people in the United States who have a criminal record. This number consistently comes out between
one-quarter and one-third of the population. A recent survey from the Society of Human Resources
Management shows that 92% of their members perform criminal background checks on some or all job
candidates (The Society of Human Resources Management is the largest association of human resources
personnel. The survey can be found in Background Checking: Conducting Criminal Background Checks
(Jan. 22, 2010)). A number of articles including 65 Million \Need Not Apply" put out by the National
Employment Law Project argue that having a criminal background can severely limit job opportunity.
While our model is binary in whether an agent is able to work or not, we believe that the actual eect
of public law enforcement observed in our model is consistent with what is observed in data.
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are likely to overestimate the benets from public law enforcement.
Figure 2.8: Uses of Production vs PLE
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2.4.3 Implications on Welfare
Turning to welfare, we observe a similar pattern to that of production relative to the
level of public law enforcement. For smaller levels of public law enforcement, increases
in the level actually reduce total welfare as seen in Figure 2.9a. Nonetheless, the range
of values for which welfare is decreasing is smaller than for production.
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Figure 2.9: Welfare
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Explaining in detail this result requires analyzing the expression for welfare. Equa-
tion (2.12) shows that welfare is given by the production of the economy minus the cost
incurred by thieves when stealing, CT , and the aversion to steal, . These two extra
terms explain why welfare and production are not the same.
U 
Z
(z;)
u(z; )dF ()dG(z) = Y   CT  ; (2.12)
where
CT  (1  )MT
Z
zzE
(1  F (E(z)))a (ls(z) jMT )
zly(z)T
(z)2
2
dG(z)
 
 Z
z<zE
Z W

+
Z
zzE
Z E(z)

!
dF ()dG(z):
Next, we analyze the eect of theft on welfare by calculating the extra consumption
that consumers in our model require in order to be indierent to an economy without
theft. The economy without theft that we consider is characterized in (B.11) of B.2.
Since welfare includes non-pecuniary costs in utility due to theft and aversion to
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steal, we analyze how much production needs to increase both including and excluding
CT and . That is, let Y
NT denote an economy where there is no theft. The solid line
in Figure 2.9b shows Y
NT+CT+
Y   1 and the dotted line shows Y
NT
Y   1.
From Figure 2.9b we can conclude that the eect of theft on welfare is considerable.
For some values of  consumption has to increase by over 7% in order to have the same
utility as in an economy without theft. Notice that considering the costs of theft and
aversion to steal lowers the amount by which consumption has to be increased for most
values of  since the parametrization shown in Section 2.4.1 implies that it is mostly
consumers with negative values of  who become thieves in equilibrium.
2.4.4 Negative Externality of Private Security
We now calculate the negative externality that is caused by hiring private security.
For this, we consider an alternative equilibrium where rms are not allowed to hire as
much private security as they nd optimal. That is, let l(z) be the optimal private
security hired by rm z; i.e. the value of ls that is a solution to (2.10). We consider an
equilibrium where rm z can only hire bls(z)  Sec  l(z), for Sec 2 (0; 1); that is, an
equilibrium where rms can only hire a fraction of the security that they nd optimal.
We keep all parameters of the model as in Table 2.4.
Figure 2.10: Production as a function of 
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Figure 2.10 contrasts the production in equilibrium for Sec = 1 (i.e. the benchmark
51
equilibrium) and for Sec = 0:5 (an equilibrium where rms can only hire half as much
security as they otherwise nd optimal). For low values of , restricting to hire private
security can increase production up to 1.5%. Private security helps diminish the wedge
caused by theft, as seen in (2.11). Nonetheless, when Sec = 1, workers that could be
hired to produce are hired as private security guards. When  is low, private security
causes a negative externality: workers that are hired as security guards could be hired
to produce the nal good. Since lower  implies a higher percentage of revenue spent
on security, the eect of reducing security is much higher for lower .
2.4.5 Sensitivity Analysis
We conduct a sensitivity analysis on the remaining variables to better understand how
they aect the model. An important parameter in our model is c. This parameter
represents the consumption level received by agents who engage in theft and are caught.
As c increases, the possibility of getting caught becomes less of a deterrent. Additionally,
the burden borne by those who are not caught increases, reducing the value of not
engaging in theft and adding incentives towards becoming a thief. As c increases,
production, the average size of rms and utility all monotonically decrease, andMT , the
measure of people who become thieves, monotonically increases in c. The implication is
that, if you do not care strongly about very negative outcomes for those who are caught
stealing, the best policy is to implement very harsh penalties. A potential reason to
avoid harsh penalties is concern for the innocent and the costly as well as potentially
inaccurate verication of guilt. This is currently outside the scope of this model.
The distribution of  represents the distribution of the moral bre of the agents
in our model. Apart from matching moments in data, it is dicult to know a proper
strategy for determining what this distribution should look like. However, we are able
to see how changing the distribution aects the results. Conceptually there are two
important components of the distribution of  which aect theft in our model. First,
the measure of people who steal is determined by the measure of people below the cuto
in the distribution of . Second, the sensitivity of the model to changes in various other
parameters depends on the density of the distribution over  at the cuto.
We make the following observations. First, the model is more sensitive to changes
in  than changes in . This is because changes in  directly increase the measure of
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people who prefer to steal whereas changes in  aect the density of people in the range
of those who prefer to steal. Lowering  increases the density of people in the range
of those who prefer to steal and vice versa. Second, for the most part the eects of
 on equilibrium moments are rather intuitive. The only unusual result is that total
welfare is not monotonic in , but this is easily explained. In all real measures, lowering
 makes the economy worse o, however, recall that  is the measure of aversion to
theft which factors directly into utility. Negative 's can be interpreted as a rush or
pleasure from stealing. As we increase the pleasure from stealing two things happen:
The measure of people who steal increases and the extra utility those agents receive
from stealing increases. If we make the aversion to theft negative enough, the overall
utility can actually begin to decrease in .
2.4.6 Extensions
We now consider two extensions to the model: First we consider a model where theft
causes a destruction of goods. That is, for every unit of good that is stolen, only a
fraction  can be consumed by thieves. In particular we replace thieves' problem (2.4)
by (2.13).
T (z)  max
0
   C (z): (2.13)
Our benchmark model is given by  = 1 and we consider economies where we change
the value of . Values such that  < 1 might act as a deterrent for thieves, since their
return for stealing is decreased. However, it might also be the case that they might
attempt to steal even more in order to achieve the same consumption as they would
otherwise get when  = 1. In equilibrium we observe that for low levels of  it is the
rst eect that dominates. For intermediate levels of , it depends on the level of public
law enforcement: In economies with low  theft increases, reducing total production in
equilibrium.
In general,  < 1 causes production to be less sensitive to the level of public law
enforcement. Moreover, for low values of  production is higher across all levels of public
law enforcement, relative to the case when  = 1. See Figure 2.11a.
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Figure 2.11: Production for dierent values of  and A
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erent values of A
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We also consider a model where theft causes labor to be less productive. We can
rationalize this as entrepreneurs knowing that their employees might be stealing from
the rm they are working at, or as employees working less time, since they devote some
time on their job to steal. We model this feature by replacing (2.3) with (2.14).
(z)  max
ly0;ls0
z ((1 AMT )ly)   wly   wls   (1  )MT (z); (2.14)
for A 2 [0; 1]. Our benchmark model is given by A = 0 and we consider economies
such that A > 0. The fact that workers are less productive when there is theft causes
production to be lower when A > 0 than in our benchmark model for all levels of public
law enforcement (See Figure 2.11a). Additionally, production becomes more sensitive
to the level of . In particular, for lower levels of public law enforcement, and increase
in the level causes higher labor productivity. For values of A that are high enough, this
increment in labor productivity counteracts the removal of agents from the labor force,
thus making production increasing in  for all levels of .
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2.5 Conclusion
In this paper we propose a model of theft, private security and public law enforcement
which matches a number of patterns in the micro data. Theft lowers total production
directly and indirectly. First, theft acts as a wedge similar to a tax for rms which
causes rms to be ineciently small since the marginal product of labor is greater than
the wage rate in equilibriums with positive amounts of theft. Private law enforcement
helps decrease this wedge, but in order to do so, some of the labor force is taken away
from producing the consumption good and used to provide security.
Perhaps the most surprising result of our model is that total production and welfare
are not monotonic in levels of public law enforcement. The interaction of theft and
public law enforcement is the source of the second mechanism which aects the total
level of production in the economy. Public law enforcement can reduce total production
and welfare because incarcerated agents are removed from the labor force. However, it
also increases the disincentives of theft which causes a reduction in the measure of agents
who elect to steal. This in turn reduces the measure of agents who are incarcerated.
The interaction of these two forces can cause non-monotonic eects on the total level
of production and welfare which might explain why we observe such vastly dierent
levels of public law enforcement. Specically, countries with low levels of public law
enforcement do not have immediate benets from small increases to the level of public
law enforcement.
Chapter 3
Linking Firm Structure and Skill
Premium
3.1 Introduction
In this paper we bring new data and new theory to bear on a longstanding question:
Why do large rms pay higher wages than smaller rms? While many explanations focus
on the fact that large rms employ disproportionately more labor-augmenting technol-
ogy than smaller rms (e.g. Dunne and Schmitz (1995), Dunne, Foster, Haltiwanger,
and Troske (2002)), we propose a dierent story: Larger rms choose organizational
structures with more levels of management, and the wages paid to managers increase as
the number of levels grows. We develop a model in which managers near the top of the
management hierarchy in large rms have a larger marginal contribution to output than
their counterparts at smaller rms since they oversee a larger quantity of rm activities.
As a result, they receive higher wages.
Our model is consistent with empirical evidence that the wage premium oered by
large rms is greater among skilled employees than among unskilled employees (e.g.
Brown and Medo (1989), Davis and Haltiwanger (1991), and Idson and Oi (1999)).
Equivalently, the skill premium (the average wage a rm pays to skilled employees
divided by the average wage it pays to unskilled employees) is increasing in rm size.
We are able to go a step further, using recent data from Chile's manufacturing sector
to show that managers in particular receive a large wage premium at large rms - much
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more so than other categories of skilled workers. The empirical literature typically
uses broad denitions of skilled and unskilled labor to study the skill premium. For
example, some studies (e.g. Dunne and Schmitz (1995) and Pavcnik (2003)) treat blue-
collar workers as skilled and white-collar workers as unskilled even though there are
substantial skill dierences within each group. (For example, both a CEO and a data
entry employee would be classied as white-collar.) By using detailed plant-level data on
employment and wages from Chile's Manufacturing Industry National Survey (ENIA)
during the period 1995-2007, we are able to obtain a more granular picture of the wage
premia oered by large rms within dierent labor categories. We construct and study
several alternative measures of the skill premium at the rm level. One measure is
the ratio of the average wage a rm's managers receive to the ratio of wages a rm's
unskilled production workers receive. Another is the ratio of average wages received
by skilled production workers (\technicians") to average wages received by unskilled
production workers. The latter ought to most directly capture any skill-bias in the
technology hired by large rms.
What we nd is striking. The eect of rm size on the manager skill premium is
close to 20 times greater than the eect of size on the production worker skill premium.
Our results suggest that managerial inputs and rm hierarchies are an important reason
why large rms pay a higher skill premium than small rms.
To investigate the relationship between rm size and the skill premium theoretically,
we develop a hierarchical model of rms that borrows elements from Caliendo and
Rossi-Hansberg (2012) in which large rms optimally choose organizational structures
with more levels of management than small rms. A manager receives direct reports
from employees on the next-lowest level (either production workers or lower-ranked
managers) and is able to augment their output multiplicatively using her managerial
labor. High-level managers at large rms, who have the scope to augment large amounts
of output, receive high wages. Small rms, producing relatively little output, have
no such high-productivity managers and therefore pay their managers lower wages on
average. Additionally, since wages for unskilled workers are constant across rms in our
model, the skill premium is increasing in rm size.
An immediate implication of the model is that managers with more direct reports
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receive higher wages. We nd evidence in the Chilean data consistent with this predic-
tion: The skill premium a rm pays to its managers is increasing in the rm's ratio of
managers to unskilled workers.
One novel feature of our model is that the number of levels of management a rm
chooses is a continuous, rather than discrete variable. Doing so gives the model sub-
stantial exibility and allows us to map the rm's production function into a class of
familiar production functions in which workers dier only in the quality units they sup-
ply. The advantage of our model, relative to those with just human capital, is that it
allows us in addition to evaluate rm hierarchical choices. While the notion of having,
say, 2.5 levels of management is not immediately intuitive, we will attempt to provide
some clarity later when we present the model.
This paper is connected to an extensive empirical literature on the relationship
between rm size and wages. Brown and Medo (1989) provided an early contribution
by showing that large rms tend to pay their workers higher wages than smaller rms.
The same phenomenon has been documented by many other researchers. For instance,
Davis and Haltiwanger (1991) study U.S. Census manufacturing data from 1963-86
and nd a steep monotonic relationship between a rm's size (in terms of number of
employees) and the average wage paid to its workers. Idson and Oi (1999) corroborate
their results using more recent Census data.
Most empirical work, including the Davis and Haltiwanger (1991) study cited above,
also shows that the wage gap between large and small rms is the largest among skilled
workers, indicating that the within-rm skill premium increases, on average, with rm
size. Haskel (1998) provides a counterpoint by showing that, among UK manufacturing
rms in the 1980s, small rms had a higher skill premium than larger rms.
Many explanations have been advanced for the wage premium paid by large rms
(for a summary, see Katz and Summers (1989)). One explanation for why large rms pay
higher wages than small rms that has garnered substantial empirical support is that
large rms demand more skilled labor than small rms. For example, Abowd, Kramarz,
and Margolis (1999) provide evidence from France, and Zweimuller and Winter-Ebmer
(2003) provide evidence from Switzerland. One reason why large rms demand more
skilled workers is that they need skilled labor to operate more advanced production
technology (See Dunne and Schmitz (1995) or Dunne, Foster, Haltiwanger, and Troske
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(2002)). While dierences in technology appear to contribute meaningfully to the wage
gap between large and small rms, a substantial portion of the variation remains unex-
plained by technological dierences.
The technological explanation for the rm-size wage gap has been adopted by re-
searchers seeking to understand the eects of international trade on labor markets.
Bernard and Bradford Jensen (1999) document that exporting rms, which tend to be
the largest rms, raise the demand for skilled labor relative to unskilled labor, leading
to increases in the skill premium. Yeaple (2005) and Bustos (2011) present models
explaining exporters' high demand for skilled labor. By serving a large international
market, exporters have a stronger incentive to invest in cost-reducing technologies than
rms that only serve a small local market. To the extent that the new, labor-saving
technologies require skilled labor to operate, large exporting rms will hire more skilled
labor than smaller rms. Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2010) further develop this
argument theoretically.
Our theoretical approach to studying the rm-size wage gap diers from existing
theories in that we focus on the eect of rm size on organizational structure. While
our model is consistent with the fact that larger rms demand higher-skilled employees
than smaller rms, we develop explicitly the idea that larger rms choose a hierarchical
structure with more levels than smaller rms. To do so, we draw on the hierarchi-
cal model of Garicano (2000) in which rms optimally choose the number of levels of
management by trading o gains from having more managers solve problems against
the costs of communication between many levels of management. The basic structure
of the model has been adapted to study the eects of international trade on organiza-
tional structure (Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012)) as well as aggregate productivity
dierences between countries (Grobovsek (2013)).
Relative to their models, our main theoretical contribution is to model the number
of management levels that a rm chooses as a continuous, rather than discrete, choice.
Doing so demonstrates that our model is essentially a standard, simple human capital
model with a restriction on rms which require them to hire specic ratios of workers
across levels of education. This gives the ability to make specic predictions about rm
organizational structure and skill premia. Instead of being perfectly substitutable in
production, imposing a structural hierarchy upon rms turns employees with varying
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levels of education into complements. Two workers cannot simply replace a manager but
must work in conjunction with managers in order to accomplish additional tasks. Larger
rms require more levels and a higher average level of human capital, and consequently
they pay a higher average wage.
Finally, our paper relates broadly to the extensive literature on the increase in the
skill premium over time observed in many countries. Skill-biased technical change is the
most prominent (and perhaps the most debated) hypothesis for why the skill premium
has risen. While many studies support the skill-biased technical change hypothesis, the
evidence is mixed. Card and DiNardo (2002) provide a review of the debate and nd
the hypothesis lacking. Pavcnik (2003) studies plant-level employment data from Chile
- though from an earlier time period than we do - and nds that skill-biased technical
change cannot explain the increases in the skill premium observed in her sample. Doms,
Dunne, and Troske (1997) come to a similar conclusion when studying U.S. manufactur-
ing plant data. In each case, controlling for unobserved plant characteristics eliminates
the eect of a plant's technology on the premium it pays to its skilled workers. While
we do not focus on the behavior of the skill premium over time, our results resonate
with theirs in that technology does not appear to be a key driver of our empirical results
concerning the skill premium.
The paper proceeds as follows: In Section 3.2 we present our data ndings. In Sec-
tion 3.3 we introduce a simple, discrete rm structure. Section 3.4 extends the rm
structure to allow for a exible selection of both levels and measure of employees. Sec-
tion 3.5 presents and characterizes a general equilibrium model with the rm structure
introduced in the previous section. Finally, Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Data
In this section we use data from the Manufacturing Industry National Survey (ENIA)
compiled by the Chilean National Statistics Institute (INE) to analyze the relationship
between size and skill premium. This database allows us to dierentiate between ex-
penditures on dierent types of skilled workers. In this way we are able to explain more
precisely how size aects skill premium.
ENIA compiles economic and accounting information for registered rms that are
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established in Chile and have 10 or more employees.1 We have annual information from
1995 to 2007 for around 4,200 rms per year, although information dierentiating types
of skilled workers is only available beginning in 2000.
The available information allows us to distinguish between skilled and unskilled
workers, as well as how much was spent on employees of each type. Unskilled workers
are non specialized workers in charge of executing tasks, mainly manual, that are directly
related to the production process (\Blue Collar"). We categorize all other employees as
skilled workers (\White Collar").2
We now analyze the relation between size and skill premium. We dene the skill
premium of a rm as the ratio of the average wage per skilled worker to the average wage
per unskilled worker. We are able to identify dierent types of skilled workers in the data.
In particular skilled workers can be further divided into owners, managers, technicians
and administrative personnel. For each rm we estimate ve measures of skill premium:
a skill premium for each of the types of skilled workers and a skill premium aggregating
across all skilled workers. Table 3.1 shows the resulting skill premium by type of skilled
worker. Note that the average manager gets paid over ve and a half times the wage
of an unskilled worker. This number is much higher than the skill premium for other
types of skilled workers.
Table 3.1: Skill Premium by Type of Skilled Worker
Managers 5.56
Technicians 1.70
Owners 2.62
Administrative Personnel 1.41
All skilled workers 1.66
Mean number of workers 48.41
Std. deviation: 75.99
Source: INE. Authors' calculations.
Next, we analyze the impact of the size of a rm on the skill premium. To do this
1INE targets rms with 10 or more employees. If a rm has more than one establishment, each
establishment is reported separately. In this case, there can be reports by establishments with under 10
employees.
2Only full-time workers are included in the analysis.
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we run the following regression:
SPi;t = 0 + 1sizeit + t + ind + "it; (3.1)
where sizeit is the natural logarithm of the total number of workers at rm i in period
t, t is a time xed eect, and ind is an industry xed eect. Table 3.2 shows that the
skill premium is increasing in the size of a rm. This result is robust across all types
of skilled workers. Moreover, size seems to aect the skill premium of managers more
than it aects the skill premium of other skilled workers. In particular, the eect of size
on the skill premium of technicians is very small: Holding all other variables constant,
an increase of 1% in the size of a rm raises the skill premium of technicians by 0.0008.
That is, even though there is a positive relation, the size of a rm does not seem to be
economically signicant in determining the skill premium of technicians.
The regression results suggest that bigger rms pay higher wages for skilled workers
due to a higher marginal productivity of managers, not of technicians. In particular,
the data casts doubt on whether larger rms acquiring skill biased capital can explain
why larger rms oer a higher skill premium, as has been proposed in the literature
(e.g. Dunne and Schmitz (1995) and Dunne, Foster, Haltiwanger, and Troske (2002)).3
Rather, our data analysis supports the importance of considering the organizational
structure of a rm when analyzing the relation between size and skill premium.
3We get similar results if we calculate the skill premium using average hourly wage instead of average
annual wage.
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Table 3.2: Skill Premium vs Size of Firm
Managers Technicians Owners Administrative All skilled
Personnel workers
Size 1:767 0:083 1:641 0:130 0:201
(0:031) (0:006) (0:033) (0:005) (0:004)
Year xed eects yes yes yes yes yes
Industry xed eects yes yes yes yes yes
Number of Observations 13; 549 20; 381 13; 623 22; 842 34; 291
Adjusted R2 0:264 0:082 0:204 0:089 0:192
OLS estimation. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
***: Signicant at 1%.
Source: INE. Authors' calculations.
We next analyze the relationship between the organizational structure of a rm
and the skill premium. For this we extend regression (3.1) to control for the ratio of
unskilled workers to managers. We label this ratio as span of control, SC. The extended
regression is as follows:
SPi;t = 0 + 1sizeit + 2SCit + t + ind + "it;
where t and ind are dened as in (3.1). Table 3.3 shows the results. We nd that the
higher the number of unskilled workers per manager, the larger the dierence in wage.
This supports the idea that rms where managers have a wider span of control oer a
higher compensation to managers.
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Table 3.3: Skill Premium for Managers vs Composition of Firm
Size 1:619
(0:034)
Span of control 0:010
(0:001)
Year xed eects yes
Industry xed eects yes
Number of Observations 13; 549
Adjusted R2 0:267
OLS estimation. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
***: Signicant at 1%.
Source: INE. Authors' calculations.
These data ndings motivate the structure of rms used in our model. We will focus
on the role of managers, abstracting from other types of skilled workers, since it is the
wages of managers that drive the relation between size and skill premium. Additionally,
the rm structure should explain why managers with more direct reports get paid more.
3.3 Discrete Firm Structure
To develop insight into the relationship between rm size and the skill premium paid to
managers, we develop a hierarchical model of rms that draws elements from Garicano
(2000) and Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012). Briey, a rm consists of several
levels of employees, with employees on the bottom level representing production workers
and employees on higher levels representing managers. Production workers complete a
number of tasks, but a fraction of their potential output is lost before their tasks are
converted into the rm's nal good. Managers on the rst level above workers receive
the uncompleted tasks from the workers who report directly to them and are able to
complete a portion of them. Tasks that even a manager on the rst level cannot complete
are handed to the next level of management, and so on. A rm chooses the number of
levels of management optimally to balance the benets of being able to solve additional
tasks against the costs of compensating the additional managers.
In our full general equilibrium model, the number of management levels chosen
by a rm is a continuous variable. We rst develop intuition by presenting a simple
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partial-equilibrium version of the model in which the number of management levels is
discrete.
Consider a rm with X 2 N levels. The structure of the rm is rigid in the sense that
specic quantities of managers at each level are required. Each worker at level x = 0
receives a measure 1 of tasks. Of those tasks, he is able to solve a share equal to 1 , and
the uncompleted fraction  2 (0; 1) of the tasks is passed to the level immediately above.
No two employees work on the same task. Each manager in level x > 0 is assigned R
direct reports from the level immediately below and so they receive a measure R(1 )
of unsolved tasks of which they are able to solve a share 1 . The unsolved fraction 
of the tasks are passed in turn to the next-highest level of management. The quantity
R is constant within a rm so that a manager above the rst management level receives
direct reports from R managers on the level immediately below. A rm's total output
is the number of tasks its workers and managers are collectively able to solve. (In the
next section, a rm's output will be a function of the number of tasks completed.)
We refer to R as the span of control of the rm. We denote employees at the lowest
level (x = 0), who receive no reports, as workers, while employees on higher levels are
managers. We will denote managers at the highest level as CEO's and we assume that
every rm has one CEO. Figure 3.1 displays the case where R = 2 for rms with X = 1
and X = 2.
Figure 3.1: Firm with one or two levels of management
(a) Firm with one level of management
CEO
Worker Worker Worker Worker
Manager Manager
(b) Firm with two levels of management
CEO
Worker Worker Worker Worker
Manager Manager
Each rm chooses the optimal number of levels of management X. Hiring additional
levels of management allows more tasks to be solved in exchange for a larger wage bill.
Specically, a rm with X levels hires RX x managers at level x > 0 and RX workers.
Furthermore, it is able to solve RX(1  X+1) tasks. Lemma 10 states and proves this
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result.
Lemma 10. Consider a rm with X levels and span of control R. Each manager in
level x 2 f1; : : : ; Xg solves a measure (R)x(1  ) of tasks. The total measure of tasks
completed by the rm is RX(1  X+1).
Proof. See C.1.
Notice that if R > 1 then the contribution of managers is increasing in the level
of management x. Assume that wages of all employees - both workers and managers -
are proportional to the number of tasks they complete (as they will be in the general
equilibrium version of the model). Dene the skill premium of a rm, SPX;R, as the
ratio of the average wage of managers to the average wage of workers. Then SPX;R can
be expressed as
SPX;R =
PX
x=1R
X x(R)x(1  )PX
x=1R
X x 
1
1  
=

1  (R  1)
RX
RX   1(1  
X);
where the rst term is the average contribution of managers and the second is the inverse
of the average contribution of workers. Lemma 11 demonstrates that the skill premium
is increasing in both levels of management and span of control.
Lemma 11. If R > 1 then SPX+1;R > SPX;R and SPX;R+1 > SPX;R.
Proof. See C.1.
The assumption R > 1 implies that each manager completes more tasks than each
of her direct reports individually. The lemma establishes two results central to the
theme of our paper for the simple, discrete version of the model. The skill premium
increases in rm size (proxied by X) because larger rms have top managers who receive
many reports (both direct and indirect) and are therefore able to complete many tasks.
On average, then, managers at large rms receive higher wages than managers at small
rms. The second part of the lemma results from the fact that managers who receive
more direct reports have the opportunity to solve more tasks that employees at lower
levels were unable to complete.
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3.4 Continuous Firm Structure
We now extend the rm structure to allow for a exible (continuous) selection of both
levels and measure of employees. Consider a rm with X levels and span of control R.
To maintain consistency between the discrete version of the model and the continuous
version, we assume a width one of CEOs. The span of control R determines the width of
managers at level x to be RX x. Let manager n 2 [0; RX x 1] in level x be a manager
who occupies a space of width one with lower edge equal to n. We dene the \area of
command" for manager n located on level x > 0 to be the set of workers and managers
who either report directly to manager n or report to a manager within the area of
command for manager n. Manager n is in charge of dealing with the unsolved tasks of
everyone within her area of command. Formally, the area of command of manager n on
level x > 0, AC(x; n), is dened as
AC(x; n) 
n
(x0; n0) : x0 2 [0; x) ; nRx x0 < n0  (n+ 1)Rx x0
o
:
To map the concept of area of command to the discrete case, consider a rm with 2
levels and span of control R = 3. The area of command of manager n = 1 on level
x = 1 is all workers at the bottom level located strictly above position 3 (= nRx) and
below position 6 (= (n+ 1)Rx). Figure 3.2 illustrates an area of command. Lemma 12
characterizes the measure of employees in AC(x; n).
Lemma 12. There is a continuum of measure 1lnR(R
x   1) of employees in area of
command AC(x; n).
Proof. The measure of managers in AC(x; n) is given byZ
(x0;n0)2AC(x;n)
dx0dn0 =
1
lnR
(Rx   1)
Corollary 5. Assume that there is a measure 1 of CEOs. Then there is a measure
RX 1
lnR of managers in a rm with X levels and span of control R.
Notice that the measure of employees in an area of command doesn't depend on
the location of manager n on level x. Therefore, without loss of generality, we'll denote
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areas of command and the tasks solved within them by the level of the manager. That
is, the area of command of a manager in oor x will be denoted by AC(x).
Figure 3.2: AC(x)
0
1
X
R
X
x
nR
x
(n+ 1)Rx
Similar to before, every employee is able to solve a measure 1    of the tasks she
is assigned. The remaining fraction is sent to a manager located in a higher level.
As before, the measure of tasks each employee is able to solve is independent of the
tasks any other employee can solve. Now, the number of reports that a manager in
level x gets from employees in level x  is equal to R. Intuitively, as we transition
from the discrete to continuous case, levels come closer together and each manager gets
less reports from the level directly below them, but there are more levels below them.
Additionally, they are able to solve only a fraction (1   ) of the tasks they receive.
Proposition 4 characterizes the number of tasks that are solved in the area of command
AC(x).
Proposition 4. Suppose each worker receives a measure one of tasks. Let T (x) be the
number of tasks that are solved in the area of command AC(x). Then
T (x) = Rx

1  e x(1 )

:
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Proof. See C.1.
Corollary 6. Assume that there is a measure 1 of CEOs. Then the total number of
tasks solved by a rm with X levels and R reports is RX(1  e X(1 )).
Now, the area of command of a manager in level x, AC(x), receives a measure Rx
of tasks to be solved. From Proposition 4, the total measure of tasks solved within this
area of command is Rx
 
1  e x(1 ), so there is a measure of Rx Rx  1  e x(1 ) =
Rxe x(1 ) of unsolved tasks that a manager at oor x faces. Of this measure she is
able to solve a fraction 1 . Therefore the marginal contribution of a manager at level
x, MCx is given by
MCx  Rxe x(1 )(1  ): (3.2)
3.5 General Equilibrium Model
We now embed the structure introduced in Section 3.4 in a general equilibrium frame-
work with consumers, rms and an education sector. Consumers supply labor inelasti-
cally and choose a quantity of education. The education a consumer receives determines
the level of a rm the consumer is qualied to work at and the wage he receives. Con-
sumers use their labor income to pay for education and the consumption good. Only by
receiving education can an individual work as a manager. Firms operate a technology
that converts completed tasks into the nal good with heterogeneous productivities,
and they choose an optimal number of levels of management, which in our model is
equivalent to choosing the size of the rm. The education sector employs educators and
is competitive.
3.5.1 Consumers
There is a measure L of consumers. All consumers are identical at the beginning of each
period and own an equal share of all rms. Consumers choose whether to work in the
education sector or the private sector by comparing the utility received from working in
the education sector, VE , with the utility received from working in the private sector,
VP .
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In order to obtain competence in educating others, educators require hE < 1 units of
instruction from other educators. Educators supply instruction in the education sector
inelastically and receive a wage of wE . The budget constraint for an educator is
cE + wEhE = wE +

L
:
This implies that the utility an educator receives is
VE  u

wE(1  hE) + 
L

;
where  denotes the total prots across all rms and u() is the utility function.
Consumers in the private sector choose a level of education x. The quantity x also
signies the level at which the consumer is able to manage at a rm. For example,
an individual with a level of education x = 1 can work at the rst (lowest) level of
management. The amount of time required for an educator to train a consumer to work
at level x is denoted by h(x). Formally, the problem of a consumer in the private sector
is:
VP max
x
u(c)
s.t. c+ wEh(x) = w(x) +

L
(3.3)
Since all consumers are ex-ante identical, it must be the case that consumers are
indierent between all choices in their optimal set. If we assume that there exists an xE
such that the level of education required to work at level xE is equivalent to the level
of education required to become an educator (i.e. h(xE) = hE), then the indierence
requirement immediately implies that wE = w(xE). This allows us to simplify the
consumer's problem to be (3.3) since VE is given by the utility obtained from choosing
xE .
Notice that in order to educate a manager to level x we require h(x) units of educator
time. Further, each of those educators requires hE units of educator time, and those
educators also need hE units of educators time, and so on. Therefore the total time
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required in order to train a manager to level x is
h(x) + h(x)hE + (h(x)hE)hE +    = h(x)
1X
n=0
hnE =
h(x)
1  hE :
3.5.2 Firms
The homogeneous nal good is produced by a continuum of rms. A rm whose em-
ployees complete T total tasks produces the nal good using technology Y (T ; z). We
make basic regularity assumptions on Y ; namely, YT > 0, YT T < 0, Yz > 0, and Y (T ; z)
satises Inada conditions on T . Firms have idiosyncratic technology parameters z dis-
tributed according to the density function f(). Given z, the rm chooses a number of
employee levels X in order to maximize prots. The structure of the rm is rigid in the
sense that a rm with X levels must employ RX x employees at each level x 2 [0; X] at
the rm. In this sense, the rm faces a modied Leontief production function for which
the proportions of employees hired at each level are xed. Workers and managers are
able to complete tasks as outlined in Section 3.4. Let T (X) denote the number of tasks
completed by a rm with X levels.4 Prots for rms are given by
(z) =max
X
Y (T (X); z) 
Z
x
w(x)l(x;X)dx
s.t. l(x;X) = RX x: (3.4)
Total prots across all rms are then  =
R
z (z)f(z)dz:
3.5.3 Relation to the Standard Model with Human Capital
At its core, our model is a model with human capital or education with the added
restriction that rms hire specic ratios of workers across levels of education. Instead
of being perfectly substitutable in production, imposing a structural hierarchy upon
rms turns employees with varying levels of education into complements. Two workers
cannot simply replace a manager but must work in conjunction with managers in order
to accomplish additional tasks. Larger rms require more levels and ultimately a higher
average level of human capital. Consequently, they pay a higher average wage.
4Recall that T (X) = RX

1  e X(1 )

; see the Corollary to Proposition 4.
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3.5.4 Equilibrium
An equilibrium is a function which maps education levels to wages, w : X ! R+, and
a function which maps rm technology endowments to an optimal number of levels for
the rm, X : Z ! R+, such that:
1. X solves the rm's problem (3.4);
2. consumers are indierent between any education level which is employed with
positive measure;
3. the total labor market clearsZ
z
Z
x
l(x;X(z))

1 +
h(x)
1  hE

f(z)dxdz = L;
4. the goods market clearsZ
z
Y (T (X(z)); z)f(z)dz =
Z
x6=xE
c(x)g(x)dx+MEc(xE);
where
ME 
Z
z
Z
x
l(x;X(z))
h(x)
1  hE f(z)dxdz
g(x)  1
L
Z
z
l(x;X(z))f(z)dz:
3.5.5 Solving the Equilibrium
We make assumptions about the functional form of h(x) and the rm structure in order
to obtain an analytical solution to the model.
Assumption 1.
h(x) = (Rxe x(1 )   1)(1  hE)
Assumption 2. The span of control is suciently wide, specically:
lnR > 1  
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We denote by w0 the wage rate for an unskilled worker on the bottom level of a
rm, who has received no education. By equilibrium condition 2 above we know that
consumers must be indierent between obtaining any education level which is employed
with positive measure. This implies that w(x) = wEh(x) + w0. Assumption 1, the
marginal productivity of a worker at level x from equation (3.2) and the fact that
wE =
w0
1 hE imply that the marginal wage bill for completing an additional task is
constant and equal to w01  . Therefore w0 is sucient for characterizing the entire wage
schedule.
Now, due to the rigid nature of the rm's structure and Assumption 2 on the span
of control R of the rm, the mapping from X to T is monotonic and we can simplify
the rm's problem to choosing the optimal number of tasks to be solved. Proposition 5
formally states and proves this.
Proposition 5. Under Assumptions 1 and 2 the rm's problem becomes:
max
T
Y (T ; z)  w0T : (3.5)
Proof. See Appendix.
This immediately implies that a rm with a higher technology parameter z will
solve more tasks. Since tasks are monotonically increasing in the number of levels,
it is also straightforward that the number of levels in a rm is increasing in z. The
continuous case oers an analytical advantage over the discrete case since solutions do
not depend on cuto values for z. The continuity in selection of tasks along z allows us
to demonstrate the existence of the equilibrium which we formalize with Proposition 6.
Proposition 6. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then an equilibrium exists.
Proof. See C.1.
Corollary 7. If Y (T ; z) = zT , then
T (z) =

z
w0
 1
1 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for each z and
w0 = 
0@E
h
z
1
1 
i
L(1  )
1A1 
clears the labor market.
3.5.6 Skill Premium
The model can help us understand the eects of rm size and structure on skill premium.
We rst develop the notion of a skill premium within the model. Similar to section 3.3,
we dene the skill premium for a rm with X levels and span of control R to be the
ratio of the average wage for managers to the wage for workers; that is,
SP (X;R) 
R
x>0w(x)l(x;X)dx=
R
x>0 l(x;X)dx
w0
:
This aligns well with the denition we use in the data where skill premium is dened as
the ratio of average wages for managers to average wages of blue collar workers. Using
this denition of skill premium, we are able to show that skill premium is increasing in
the size of the rm.
Lemma 13. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, @SP@X > 0.
Proof. See C.1.
Next, we show that the skill premium is increasing in the span of control of the rm.
Lemma 14. Under Assumption 1, @SP@R > 0.
Proof. See C.1.
In our model, there is a monotonic relationship between the size of rms and the
number of levels the rm employs. Therefore, Lemma 13 aligns with our rst empirical
observation, namely, that skill premium is increasing with size. This is a direct result
of the fact that managers at higher levels have a higher marginal productivity than
managers at lower levels and workers. As more levels are added, the average productivity
of managers increases and since the productivity per worker is constant in size, the result
is obtained.
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The intuition for our second result is similar. The number of tasks passing through
a manager in a given level is increasing in the number of his direct reports. As the
manager's span of control increases so does his marginal contribution to the rm. In
our model this directly correlates to the manager's compensation due to our educational
structure, thus our second result 14. This result can be generalized by relaxing our
assumption on education and adding consumer heterogeneity. In any model where
marginal contribution and wages are positively related a similar result will hold. This is
also consistent with the second fact we observe in the data, namely, that skill premium
is increasing in the ratio of workers per manager.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper we use recent data from the Chilean Manufacturing Survey to document
that, consistent with previous ndings, skill premium is positively related with the size
of rms. We exploit the rich information we have on dierent types of skilled workers
to estimate the relationship between skill premia by worker type and size. We nd that
the eect of size on skill premium is much greater for managers than for technicians.
From this we conclude that the organizational structure of the rm is important in
explaining the positive relationship between size and skill premium. Further ndings
on the positive correlation between the ratio of workers to managers and skill premium
suggest that span of control plays a key role in a rm's organizational structure.
We build on the discrete structural models in the literature a la Garicano (2000)
and Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) by developing a simple continuous version of
the model which maps higher levels of management to higher levels of human capital.
The model allows for a closed form analytical solution and provides comparative statics
which make specic predictions about the aects of organizational structure on its wage
structure; namely, the two facts in the data outlined above.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Characterizing the boundaries that determine the oc-
cupational choices
In this section we will characterize the boundaries that determine the occupational
choice of consumers given values of w, rD and rL. This characterization allows us to
analyze how changes in  aect production. Consumers will make an occupational choice
depending on the utility they can achieve from that occupation (see (1.1)). Lemma 15
characterizes the utility that consumers get depending on their occupational choice.
Lemma 15. The utility of consumer (z; a) is
u(z; a) =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
(1 + ) ln a+w1+ +  ln(1 + r
D) if (z; a) 2 W
(1 + ) ln a1+ +  ln(1 + r
B) if (z; a) 2 B
(1 + ) ln

a
1+ +
1 
1+

z
1+rL
 1
1   
w
 
1 

+  ln(1 + rL) if (z; a) 2 EL
(1 + ) ln

a
1+ +
1 
1+

z
1+rD
 1
1   
w
 
1 

+  ln(1 + rD) if (z; a) 2 ED
ln a1+ +  ln z


1+
a
w

if (z; a) 2 EO:
Proof. In this model c2(z; a) = (1 + r(z; a))c1(z; a) for all consumers (z; a), where
r(z; a) = rD for (z; a) 2 W, r(z; a) = rB for (z; a) 2 B and it is dened in Corollary 1
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of Lemma 3 for (z; a) 2 E . Therefore
u(z; a) = (1 + ) ln c1(z; a) +  ln(1 + r(z; a)):
The proof of the lemma follows then from Lemmas 2 and 3.
We now compare the utility derived from two occupations at a time. Lemmas 16 to
22 show the boundaries that arise from these comparisons. The proof of these lemmas
follows from Lemma 15. It is worth noticing that some boundaries only depend on the
level of wealth (the choice between being a worker and a banker), or exclusively on the
skill level (the choice between being a worker and an entrepreneur that saves). The rest
of the boundaries depend on a combination of both wealth and skill level.
Lemma 16. Let
aW;B  w
1+rB
1+rD
 
1+   1
:
If a  aW;B then (z; a) 62 W and if a < aW;B then (z; a) 62 B.
Lemma 17. Let
zW;ED =

1
1  
1  1


w(1 + rD):
If z < zW;ED then (z; a) 62 ED and if z  zW;ED then (z; a) 62 W.
Lemma 18. Let
W;EO(a) = 
1 (1 + rD)
w

a+ w
1 + 
 1+


1 + 
a
 1+

:
If z < W;EO(a) then (z; a) 62 EO and if z  W;EO(a) then (z; a) 62 W.
Lemma 19. Let
W;EL(z) =
w   (1  )

1+rL
1+rD
 
1+

z
1+rL
 1
1   
w
 
1 
1+rL
1+rD
 
1+   1
:
If a < W;EL(z) then (z; a) 62 EL and if a  W;EL(z) then (z; a) 62 W.
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Lemma 20. Let
B;ED(z) =
(1  )

z
1+rD
 1
1   
w
 
1 
1+rB
1+rD
 
1+   1
:
If a  B;ED(z) then (z; a) 62 ED and if a < B;ED(z) then (z; a) 62 B.
Lemma 21. Let
B;EO(z) =
1

(1 + )
1+
(1 )
(1 + )
1+
(1 )

z
1 + rB
 1
1  
w
 
1 
:
If a  B;EO(z) then (z; a) 62 EO and if a < B;EO(z) then (z; a) 62 B.
Lemma 22. Let
B;EL(z) =
(1  )

z
1+rL
 1
1   
w
 
1 
1+rB
1+rL
 
1+   1
:
If a  B;EL(z) then (z; a) 62 EL and if a < B;EL(z) then (z; a) 62 B.
Additionally to the boundaries shown in the previous lemmas, there are two other
boundaries we need to take into account: ED;EO(z) and EO;EL(z). As mentioned in
Lemma 3,
ED;EO(z) 
1 + 


z
1 + rD
 1
1  
w
 
1 
EO;EL(z) 
1 + 


z
1 + rL
 1
1  
w
 
1 
:
Entrepreneurs with a < EO;EL(z) will borrow, entrepreneurs with a  ED;EO(z) will
save, and entrepreneurs with EO;EL(z)  a < ED;EO(z) will spend all their available
wealth in paying for workers. It is worth mentioning that these boundaries do not
depend on utility, but rather on feasibility: If an entrepreneur borrows (sE(z; a) < 0)
then this entrepreneur cannot choose to save.
Proposition 7 characterizes the sets of consumers. There are three cases: If the
spread between the return of setting up a bank, rB, and the interest rate on deposits,
rD is suciently low, then there will be three types of entrepreneurs. On the other
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extreme, if the spread between rB and the interest rate on loans, rL is suciently large,
in equilibrium there will only be entrepreneurs that borrow.
Proposition 7. If in equilibrium

1+
1+
 1+
  1+rB
1+rD
, then there will be the three types
of entrepreneurs. In this case the occupational choice of consumers is characterized by
the following sets:
B = [z; zW;ED) [aW;B; a]
[
f(z; a) : z  zW;ED and a  B;ED(z)g
W = [z; zW;ED) [a; aW;B)
[
f(z; a) : z  zW;ED ; a  a; z < zW;EO;EL and z < W;EO(a)g[
f(z; a) : z  zW;EO;EL ; a  a and a < W;EL(z)g
ED = f(z; a) : z  zW;ED and ED;EO(z)  a < B;ED(z)g
EO = f(z; a) : z  W;EO(a) and EO;EL(z)  a < ED;EO(z)g
EL = f(z; a) : a  W;EL(z) and a  a < EO;EL(z)g ;
where
zW;EO;EL 

1

0BB@ 
(1 + )

1+rL
1+rD
 
1+   (1 + )
1CCA
1 
w(1 + rL):
If in equilibrium 1+r
B
1+rL


1+
1+
 1+

< 1+r
B
1+rD
, then there will be no entrepreneurs
that deposit. In this case the occupational choice of consumers is characterized by the
following sets:
B = [z; zW;B;EO) [aW;B; a]
[
f(z; a) : z  zW;B;EO and a  B;EO(z)g
W = [z; zW;B;EO) [a; aW;B)
[
f(z; a) : z  zW;B;EO ; a  a; z < zW;EO;EL and z < W;EO(a)g[
f(z; a) : z  zW;EO;EL ; a  a and a < W;EL(z)g
EO = f(z; a) : z  W;EO(a) and EO;EL(z)  a < B;EO(z)g
EL = f(z; a) : a  W;EL(z) and a  a < EO;EL(z)g ;
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where
zW;B;EO 
(1 + )
1+

(1 + )
1+


1

0BB@ 
1+rB
1+rD
 
1+   1
1CCA
1 
w(1 + rB):
If in equilibrium 1+r
B
1+rL
>

1+
1+
 1+

, then there will only be entrepreneurs that bor-
row. In this case the occupational choice of consumers is characterized by the following
sets:
B = [z; zW;B;EL) [aW;B; a]
[
f(z; a) : z  zW;B;EL and a  B;EL(z)g
W = [z; zW;B;EL) [a; aW;B)
[
f(z; a) : z  zW;B;EL ; a  a and a < W;EL(z)g
EL = f(z; a) : a  W;EL(z) and a  a < B;EL(z)g :
where
zW;B;EL 

1
1  
1  1

0BB@

1+rB
1+rL
 
1+   1
1+rB
1+rD
 
1+   1
1CCA
1 
w(1 + rL):
Proof. The strategy to prove the proposition relies on the fact that, depending on the
values of 1+r
B
1+rD
and 1+r
B
1+rL
, some types of entrepreneurs will not exist. This will be a
consequence of the slope of some boundaries.
First, recall from Lemma 1 that rB > rL > rD in equilibrium as long as  <1. Let
aW;ED;EO =
1 + 
(1  )w:
Notice that
B;ED (zW;ED) = aW;B
W;EO (aW;ED;EO) = zW;ED
ED;EO (zW;ED) = aW;ED;EO :
As long as aW;B  aW;ED;EO there will exist entrepreneurs that save in equilibrium.
aW;B  aW;ED;EO and B;ED(z)  ED;EO(z) if and only if

1+
1+
 1+
  1+rB
1+rD
. Finally,
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EO;EL(z) > ED;EO(z) since r
L > rD, so if

1+
1+
 1+
  1+rB
1+rD
there will be entrepreneurs
that neither borrow nor deposit.
Now consider the case where there are no entrepreneurs that save in equilibrium.
Notice that
W;EO (aW;B) = zW;B;EO
B;EO (zW;B;EO) = aW;B:
Let
aW;EO;EL 
1 + 
(1 + )

1+rL
1+rD
 
1+   (1 + )
w:
Notice that
W;EO (aW;EO;EL) = zW;EO;EL
EO;EL (zW;EO;EL) = aW;EO;EL
W;EL (zW;EO;EL) = aW;EO;EL ;
so as long as aW;B  aW;EO;EL there will exist entrepreneurs that neither borrow nor
save. aW;B  aW;EO;EL and B;EO(z)  EO;EL(z) if and only if

1+
1+
 1+
  1+rB
1+rL
.
Finally notice that
W;EL (zW;B;EL) = aW;B
B;EL (zW;B;EL) = aW;B:
If

1+
1+
 1+

< 1+r
B
1+rL
there will only be entrepreneurs that borrow in equilibrium.
Lemma 23 determines the skill level z0W;EL above which there will be no workers.
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Lemma 23. Let
z
a
W;EL =
0BBB@
w   a

1+rL
1+rD
 
1+   1

1  
1CCCA
1  w


(1 + rL)

1 + rD
1 + rL
(1 )
1+
Then
W;EL

z
a
W;EL

= a:
A.2 Characterizing the boundaries that determine the oc-
cupational choice as !1
In this section we will characterize the boundaries that determine the occupational
choice of consumers given values of w and r. Consumers will choose their occupation
depending on the utility they can derive from it (see (1.9)). Lemma 24 characterizes
the utility derived from each occupation.
Lemma 24. The utility of consumer (z; a) is
u(z; a) =
8><>:
(1 + ) ln a+w1+ +  ln(1 + r) if (z; a) 2 W
(1 + ) ln

a
1+ +
1 
1+

z
1+r
 1
1   
w
 
1 

+  ln(1 + r) if (z; a) 2 E :
Proof. In this model c2(z; a) = (1 + r)c1(z; a) for all consumers (z; a). Therefore
u(z; a) = (1 + ) ln c1 +  ln(1 + r):
The proof of the lemma follows from Lemmas 4 and 5.
We now compare the utility derived from the two occupations. Lemma 25 shows
the boundary that arises from this comparison. The proof of this lemma follows from
Lemma 24. It is worth noticing that this boundary only depends on the skill level.
Lemma 25. Let
zW;E 

1
1  
1  1


w(1 + r):
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If z < zW;E then (z; a) 2 W and if z  zW;E then (z; a) 2 E.
Proposition 8 characterizes the sets of consumers.
Proposition 8. Consumer occupations are characterized by
W = f(z; a) : z < zW;Eg
E = f(z; a) : z  zW;Eg :
A.2.1 Solving the model
Let
A 
Z
adG(z  a)
Since for each individual, consumption in the two periods is related by
c2(z; a) = (1 + r)c1(z; a):
This must also hold in summation, which implies:Z
c2(z; a)dG(z  a) =
Z
(1 + r)c1(z; a)dG(z  a): (A.1)
We use Lemmas 5 and 25 and the market clearing condition for labor to solve for
Cw;r  w(1 + r). This allows us to have an expression for total production. Then we
use A and total production to solve for r using (A.1). Finally we solve for w.
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A.3 Social Planner Problem
The Social Planner Problem is
max
l(z);c1(z;a);c2(z;a);o
Z
(v(c1(z; a) + v(c2(z; a))) dG(z  a)Z
c1(z; a)dG(z  a) =
Z
adG(z  a)Z
c2(z; a)dG(z  a) =
Z
E
zl(z)dG(z  a)Z
E
l(z)dG(z  a) =
Z
W
dG(z  a):
Notice that aggregate consumption in period 1 is exogenous, so maximizing social
welfare implies maximizing production in the second period. Now, the marginal pro-
ductivity of labor is constant across all rms, but adding an extra entrepreneur implies
increasing the marginal productivity of labor, since the average size of a rm decreases.
So solving the Social Planner Problem reduces to nding a boundary above which con-
sumers will become entrepreneurs. We know that
l(z) =
 z
MPL
 1
1 
:
From the labor market clearing condition we have
 
MPL
 1
1 
Z
zzW;E
z
1
1 dG(z  a) = G^(zW;E);
where
G^(z0) 
Z
z<z0
dG(z  a):
Then
MPL = 
0@(1  G^(zW;E))E
h
z
1
1  jz  zW;E
i
G^(zW;E)
1A1  :
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The Social Planner Problem is equivalent to
max
zW;E
H(zW;E)  max
zW;E
Z
E
zf(l(z))dG(z  a)
= max
zW;E


MPL(zW;E)
 
1 
Z
zzW;E
z
1
1 dG(z  a)
= max
zW;E

1  G^(zW;E)
1 
E
h
z
1
1  jz  zW;E
i1 
G^(zW;E):
A.4 Select Proofs
A.4.1 Proof of Lemma 6
To prove this Lemma it is sucient to consider aggregate wealth across the dierent
occupational choices. That is, let AO denote the aggregate wealth endowed to consumers
who choose occupation O, where O 2 fW;B; EL; EO; EDg. Additionally, let
ZED 
Z
ED
z
1
1 dG(z  a)
1 
ZEL 
Z
EL
z
1
1 dG(z  a)
1 
:
That is, Z
1
1 
ED (Z
1
1 
EL ) is the
1
1  -th moment of the skill endowed to the entrepreneurs
that are depositors (borrowers). Finally let MW be the mass of workers:
MW 
Z
W
dG(z  a):
Then the market clearing condition for deposits can be written as

1 + 
(wMW +AW) +

1 + 
AED  
1 + 
1 + 

ZED
1 + rD
 1
1  
w
 
1 
= 

1 + 
AB; (A.2)
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for loans as

1 + 
AEL  
1 + 
1 + 

ZEL
1 + rL
 1
1  
w
 
1 
+ (1 + )

1 + 
AB = 0; (A.3)
and for labor as
MW =

ZEL
(1 + rL)w
 1
1 
+

1 + 
AEO
w
+

ZED
(1 + rD)w
 1
1 
: (A.4)
(A.2) and (A.3) can rewritten as (A.5) and (A.6), respectively.

ZEL
(1 + rL)w
 1
1 
=

1 + 
(AEL + (1 + )AB)

w
(A.5)
ZED
(1 + rD)w
 1
1 
=

1 + 
(wMW +AW +AED   AB)

w
: (A.6)
Plugging (A.5) and (A.6) into the labor market clearing condition we get
MW =

1 + 
(AEL + (1 + )AB)

w
+

1 + 
AEO
w
+

1 + 
(wMW +AW +AED   AB)

w
:
(A.7)
The result follows from reorganizing (A.7).
A.4.2 Assumptions on parameters in Section 1.5.2
The following assumptions on parameters guarantee that the prices stated in Proposition
1 are an equilibrium:
z2 >

1
1  
1  1


w(1 + rL) > z1:
This assumption guarantees that consumers with z = z2 choose to become entrepreneurs
are entrepreneurs while the other consumers don't.
a2 >
w
1+rB
1+rD
 
1+   1
> a1:
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This assumption guarantees that consumers with a = a2 choose to become bankers and
consumers with a = a1 choose to become workers.
a >
1 + 


z2
1 + rD
 1
1  
w
 
1 
:
This assumption guarantees that there are entrepreneurs that deposit.
0 < (  )(1  a)za2   (1  z)a
2
  (1 + )aza1 < (1  z)a
2
:
The rst inequality is consistent with the existence of consumers other than workers
that save; namely, entrepreneurs that deposit. The second inequality is consistent with
the existence of consumers that do not save; namely. entrepreneurs that borrow and
entrepreneurs that neither borrow nor deposit.
(1 + )(1  a)za2
<
 
1  z
2a
 1
2
 

(  )(1  a)za2   (1  z)a
2
  (1 + )aza1
 1
2
!2
:
This nal assumption guarantees that rL > rD, which is necessary to have an equilib-
rium.
A.4.3 Proof of Proposition 1
The strategy to prove this proposition will be to assume that parameter values are
such that an equilibrium exist. Then we show that the conditions on this parameters
satisfy what is stated in A.4.2. We will also build on the proof of Lemma 6. Given the
denitions in A.4.1, under eG() we have
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MW = az
AW = a1az
AB = a2(1  a)z
AED =
1  z
a
Z a
ED;EO (z)
ada (A.8)
AEL =
1  z
a
Z EO;EL (z)
0
ada
ZED = z2

1  z
a
1 
(a  ED;EO(z))1 
ZEL = z2

1  z
a
1 
(EO;EL(z))
1  :
Reorganizing (A.5) and (A.6) we get
1 + rL = ZEL

w
 1 + 
 (AEL + (1 + )AB)
1 
1 + rD = ZED

w
 1 + 
 (wMW +AW +AED   AB)
1 
: (A.9)
The result follows form plugging (A.8) into (A.9), and using the result from Lemma
6. The proof that the assumptions stated in A.4.2 are sucient restrictions on the
parameters arises from guaranteeing that there are no negative roots in the resulting
rL and rD and by using the characterization of the boundaries that determine the
occupational choices in the model (See A.1).
A.4.4 Proof of Proposition 2
The proof of this proposition relies on the result stated in Proposition 1. Notice that
MW and A are constant in the model. Then we can write rL and rD as
1 + rL =
z2

(1 + )1 

MW
A

C
1 
2
L
1 + rD =
z2

(1 + )1 

MW
A

C1 D :
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Notice that rL   rD is a function of CL   CD. Furthermore, from the corollary to
Proposition 1 this dierence is decreasing in .
Now, total production in this economy is given by the sum of what is produced by
each type of entrepreneur. Let YT be total production by entrepreneur of type T , where
T 2 fL;O;Dg. Taking into account the results in Proposition 1 and Lemma 3 we have
YL = z2
1  z
a

1
1 + 
MW
A
 1
CL
 1+
2
YO = z2
1  z
a

1
1 + 
MW
A
 1
1 + 
"
1
CD
1+
 

1
CL
 1+
2
#
YD = z2
1  z
a

1
1 + 
MW
A

a  1CD

1
CD

:
The result follows from adding YT for T 2 fL;O;Dg.
A.4.5 Proof of Lemma 7
The proof of this lemma relies on what is proven in A.1. First, from Proposition 7 we
see that a consumer with skill z1 and wealth a1 choose to be an entrepreneur that is
able to use its wealth to pay for workers. Additionally, if a = 0 a consumer with skill z2
and wealth a = 0 chooses to become an entrepreneur that needs to borrow to pay for
workers according to Lemma 17 and Proposition 7. Finally,
z2   z1 =

1
1  
1  1


(1 + rD)
(1 )
1+
h
(1 + rL)
1+
1+   (1 + rD) 1+1+
i
;
which is increasing in rL   rD.
Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Proof of Lemma 9
Since  > 0:5, the following rst order conditions of (2.10) characterize the solution to
this problem:
w +
(1  )MT
 (ls)
= zl 1y (B.1)
w = (1  )MT ly 
0 (ls)
 (ls)
2 : (B.2)
Solving for ly in (B.1) yields
ly =
0@ z
w + (1 )MT(ls)
1A 11  : (B.3)
Plugging (B.3) in (B.2) yields
w =

z
w(ls) + (1  )MT
 1
1 
(1  )MT0(ls)(ls)
1
1  2:
Our assumption that  (ls) 


1  ls
 1 

satises
0(ls)(ls)
1
1  2 = 1;
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so in equilibrium
ls(z) =
1  


(1  )MT
w
z
w
 

(1  )MT
w
 1 
: (B.4)
Plugging (B.4) into (B.3) yields
ly(z) =

z
w
 

(1  )MT
w
 11 
: (B.5)
Plugging (B.4) and (B.5) into (2.5) yields
(z) =

w
(1  )MT
1 z
w
 

(1  )MT
w
 1 
: (B.6)
Finally, (z) results from plugging (B.4) to (B.6) into the objective function of (2.3):
(z) =
1  

w

z
w
 

(1  )MT
w
 11 
:
B.2 Model  = 1
Assume  = 1. Depending on parameter values, in equilibrium there could be theft.
That is, even if thieves cannot consume what they steal, their aversion to becoming
thieves, , and the consumption they get when they get caught, c, can be such that
some households are better o stealing. If  = 1 then Lemma 8 implies
W =
c
1 MT   w (B.7)
E(z) =
c
1 MT   (z):
There will be theft in an equilibrium with  = 1 as long as W  inf supp fF ()g. In
this case rm z's problem is
(z)  max
ly0;ls0
zly   wly   wls: (B.8)
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The solution of (B.8) is
ly(z) =
z
w
 1
1 
ls(z) = 0: (B.9)
Plugging (B.9) into (B.8) we have
(z) = (1  )z 11 

w
 
1 
:
Notice that (z) is strictly increasing in z, so there exists a cuto zE such that (zE) =
w, which implies consumers choose to be workers for z < zE and decide to be en-
trepreneurs for z  zE and
zE =

1
1  
1  1


w:
Then the equilibrium in this case is characterized by w and MT such that
MT = F (
W )G(zE) +
Z
zzE
F (E(z))dG(z)Z
zzE
ly(z)(1  F (E(z)))dG(z) = (1  F (W ))G(zE) (B.10)
W  inf

supp fF ()g :
If the rst two equations of (B.10) are satised, but the third one is not, then we
have an economy as in Lucas (1978). That is, there is no theft in equilibrium and
consumers choose between being workers or entrepreneurs. Firms' prots are given by
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(B.8) with MT = 0, so the equilibrium of this economy is characterized by (B.11).
MT = 0 (B.11)
ly(z) =
z
w
 1
1 
zE =

1

 1
1  
1 
wZ
zzE
ly(z)dG(z) = G(z
E):
Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Select Proofs
C.1.1 Proof of Lemma 10
We will rst prove by induction on x that each manager at level x > 0 is able to
solve (R)x(1   ) tasks. Consider rst the measure of tasks that workers solve: by
assumption each worker receives a measure one of tasks of which he is unable to solve
a fraction  which he passes on to managers in level x = 1. Now, each manager at
level x = 1 receives R direct reports. Therefore each manager at level x = 1 receives a
measure R of tasks, out of which they solve a fraction 1  and passes on the remaining
to managers at level x = 2.
Consider a manager at level x and assume that he solves a measure (R)x(1   )
of tasks. A manager at level x+ 1 receives R direct reports, each of which passes on a
measure (R)x of unsolved tasks. Of this measure he is able to solve a fraction 1  .
This implies that (R)x+1(1  ).
Since there are RX x managers in level x, the total number of tasks TX is given by
TX =
X
x=0
RX x(R)x(1  )
= RX(1  X+1):
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C.1.2 Proof of Lemma 11
First we will prove that SPX+1;R > SPX;R. For this it is sucient to prove that
RX+1
RX+1   1(1  
X+1) >
RX
RX   1(1  
X);
which is equivalent to proving that
R
PX
x=0 
xPX 1
x=0 
x
>
PX
x=0R
xPX 1
x=0 R
x
: (C.1)
(C.1) holds if and only if
R
 
X 1
x=0
Rx
! 
X
x=0
x
!
>
 
X
x=0
Rx
! 
X 1
x=0
x
!
() X
X 1
x=1
Rx >
X 1
x=0
x
()
X 1
x=0
x (R)X x >
X 1
x=0
x: (C.2)
Since R > 1, x on the left hand side of (C.2) is multiplied by a term greater than one
for all x 2 f0; : : : ; X   1g. Therefore the left hand side is strictly greater than the right
hand side and the proof follows.
Now we prove that SPX;R+1 > SPX;R. For this it is sucient to prove that
R
(R+ 1)X
(R+ 1)X   1 > (R  1)
RX
RX   1 ;
which is equivalent to proving that
R(RX   1)(R+ 1)X > (R  1)RX((R+ 1)X   1): (C.3)
(C.3) holds if and only if
(RX  R)(R+ 1)X + (RX+1  RX) > 0;
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which holds if R > 1. Notice that R > 1 and  2 (0; 1) imply R > 1, which completes
the proof.
C.1.3 Proof of Proposition 4
We will prove the result by rst considering levels of width  and calculating by induc-
tion the total number of tasks solved in AC(x) as ! 0. In each level x0 2 [0; x] of area
of command AC(x) there are Rx x0 employees. Workers in AC(x; n) receive a measure
1 of tasks and are able to solve a fraction (1   ) of them. Each manager in level 
receives R(1   (1   )) tasks and is able to solve a fraction (1   ). Since there
is a measure Rx  of managers at level , the total measure of tasks that managers
at level  solve is Rx(1   (1   ))(1   ). Each employee in level 2 manages a
width of R direct reports, each of whom passes on R (1 (1  ))2 unsolved tasks.
Each manager in level 2 is able to solve a fraction (1   ) of those tasks. There
is a measure Rx 2 of managers at level 2, so the total measure of tasks that these
managers solve is Rx(1 (1  ))2(1  ).
Now assume that managers at level i solve a measure Ri(1 (1  ))i(1 )
of tasks. There are Rx i managers at this level. So the total measure of tasks solved
by managers at this level is Rx(1 (1 ))i(1 ). Each employee at level (i+1)
manages a width of R direct reports, each of whom passes on Ri (1 (1  ))i+1
unsolved tasks. Each manager in level (i + 1) is able to solve a fraction (1   ) of
those tasks. Since there are Rx (i+1) managers at level i + 1, the total measure of
tasks solved by these managers is Rx(1   (1   ))i+1(1   ). Therefore the total
measure of tasks solved in area of command AC(x) is
T (x)  lim
!0
(1  )Rx
b xcX
i=0
(1 (1  ))i
= lim
!0
Rx(1  (1 (1  ))b xc+1)
= Rx

1  e x(1 )

;
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where the last line is due to the fact that
lim
!0
x

ln (1 (1  )) =  x(1  ):
C.1.4 Proof of Proposition 5
Recall from Proposition 4 that the number of tasks a rm solves is given by T (X) =
RX
 
1  e X(1 ). Equilibrium condition 2 requires that consumers be indierent
between obtaining any education levels which are employed with positive measure.
This implies that w(x) = wEh(x) + w. Now, for an educator it must hold that
wE = wEhE + w, so wE =
w
1 hE . Therefore
w(x) =
w
1  hE h(x) + w: (C.4)
Plugging (C.4) and the labor requirements at each level into the rm's problem we
get:
max
X
Y (T (X); z) 
Z
x
RX x

w
1  hE h(x) + w

dx
=max
X
Y (T (X); z) RX
Z
x
we x(1 )dx
=max
X
Y (T (X); z)  wT (X); (C.5)
where the second line is a consequence of Assumption 1.
Assumption 2 on the span of control implies that T (X) is strictly increasing in X.1
Therefore (C.5) is equivalent to
max
T
Y (T ; z)  wT :
C.1.5 Proof of Proposition 6
Proposition 5 implies that the solution to (3.5) is sucient to derive a function X :
Z ! R+ that satises the equilibrium conditions given wages.
1T 0(X) = RX

lnR  e X(1 ) (lnR  (1  ))

. Since lnR > 1  , 1   > 0 and e X(1 ) < 1,
then T 0(X) > 0.
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Denote by T (z; w) the solution to (3.5). The regularity conditions on Y (T ; w) imply
that T (z; w) is strictly decreasing in w, limw!1 T (z; w) = 0 and limw!0 T (z; w) =
1 since T (z; w) satises
YT (T (z; w); z) = w:
Denote by X(z; w) the value of X that achieves T (z; w). Notice that X(z; w) is also
strictly decreasing in w. Let
H(w) 
Z
z
Z
x
l(x;X(z; w))

1 +
h(x)
1  hE

f(z)dxdz
=
Z
z
Z
x
RX
(z;w) xRxe x(1 )f(z)dxdz
=
1
1  
Z
z
T (z; w)f(z)dz:
Then the regularity conditions on Y (T ; w) imply that H(w) is strictly decreasing in w,
limw!1H(w) = 0 and limw!0H(w) = 1. Since the labor market clearing condition
implies L = H(w), the result follows.
C.1.6 Proof of Lemma 13
Plugging in h(x) from Assumption 1 and the denition of l(x;X) we get
SP (X) = lnR
1
1  
RX
RX   1(1  e
 X(1 )):
Consider
g(X)  R
X
RX   1(1  e
 X(1 )):
It is sucient to prove that g0(X) > 0. Now
g0(X) =
RX
e(1 )X(RX   1)2

(1  )(RX   1)  lnR

eX(1 )   1

:
It is sucient to prove that bg(X)  (1   )(RX   1)   lnR  eX(1 )   1 > 0 for all
X > 0. First notice that bg(0) = 0. Now,
bg0(X) = (1  ) lnRRX   eX(1 ) ;
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so lnR > 1   implies that bg0(X) > 0.
C.1.7 Proof of Lemma 14
Plugging in h(x) from Assumption 1 and the denition of l(x;X) we get
SP (X) = lnR
1
1  
RX
RX   1(1  e
 X(1 )):
Let g(R) = lnR R
X
RX 1 . It is sucient to prove that g
0(R) > 0. Now
g0(R) =
RX 1
(RX   1)2
 
RX   1  lnRX :
Since x  1 > lnx for any x > 0, the result follows.
